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Abstract 
 
 
The prevalence of Search Engine Poisoning in trending topics and popular search terms on 
the web within search engines is investigated. Search Engine Poisoning is the act of 
manipulating search engines in order to display search results from websites infected with 
malware.  
 
Research done between February and August 2012, using both manual and automated 
techniques, shows us how easily the criminal element manages to insert malicious content 
into web pages related to popular search terms within search engines. 
 
In order to provide the reader with a clear overview and understanding of the motives and the 
methods of the operators of Search Engine Poisoning campaigns, an in-depth review of 
automated and semi-automated web exploit kits is done, as well as looking into the motives 
for running these campaigns. 
 
Three high profile case studies are examined, and the various Search Engine Poisoning 
campaigns associated with these case studies are discussed in detail to the reader.  
 
From February to August 2012, data was collected from the top trending topics on Google’s 
search engine along with the top listed sites related to these topics, and then passed through 
various automated tools to discover if these results have been infiltrated by the operators of 
Search Engine Poisoning campaings, and the results of these automated scans are then 
discussed in detail. 
 
During the research period, manual searching for Search Engine Poisoning campaigns was 
also done, using high profile news events and popular search terms. These results are 
analysed in detail to determine the methods of attack, the purpose of the attack and the parties 
behind it. 
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1.Introduction 
 
According to Reuters [1], there were over two billion users on the internet in 2010. This is 
nearly a third of the world population. By 2012 New Media1 reports that this number 
increased to 2.2 billion, representing 37% of the world’s population. Google announced in 
20082 that it had processed over one trillion links. Helping such a vast amount of users look 
for the right content in the ever-expanding internet are the search engines.  
 
Users rely on search engines to provide them with an easy method of finding the information 
they require on the internet. As of the writing of this document, there are currently two large 
players in the search engine space: Google's search engine, and Microsoft Bing. While there 
are other, smaller search engines, this document will focus on these two large entities due to 
their market share. Internet users rely on them to provide them with information relevant to 
their search, even if the search terms are vague and sometimes slightly incorrect (e.g. a 
spelling mistake in the search term, or words in the incorrect order). 
 
Hotchkiss et al [2] studied the effect of the 'Golden Triangle', an area on a Google search 
page that attracts the most eye scan activity, and states that “unless your site is listed in the 
top three sites on the page, your chances of being seen by a searcher is dramatically reduced”. 
It is this attempt to attract users to visit sites that has led to a variety of methods being 
developed to enhance the chances of users visiting a particular site. Some of these methods 
involve placing the sites in this Golden Triangle, thus increasing the chance of visibility of 
the site, and the chance that the user will visit the site. Achieving high rankings is what drives 
an entire industry, and has also caught the interest of those who have less than honest 
intentions on the web.  
 
The method of improving the chances of sites appearing in high-ranking positions in a search 
                                                        
1
 http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/world-overview/34-world-usage-patterns-and-demographics 
2 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html 
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engine’s listing is called Search Engine Optimisation, and has spawned a whole industry 
devoted to it, as will be discussed later in the paper. Users on the internet are not above 
abusing the ranking system of search engines, and will alter the ranking on purpose through 
various different ways. We look at the phenomenon of Google Bombing as such an example 
in section 2.2. 
 
Part of user abuse (malicious or not) to improve visibility of a site, i.e. be part of the Golden 
Triangle, has resulted in an increase in search engine manipulation. Search engine 
manipulation is defined by Imperva3 as  “manipulating search engines to display search 
results that contain references to malware-delivering websites”.  
 
The criminal elements and their attempts to gain entry into this Golden Triangle as described 
by Hotchkiss et al., has also led to the term 'Search Engine Poisoning' being coined, 
sometimes referred to as 'Search Engine Manipulation', depending on how successful these 
attempts are. Thus, the legitimate way of influencing search engines is called Search Engine 
Optimisation (SEO), while the illegitimate ways of influencing search engines can be called 
Search Engine Manipulation (SEM), or Search Engine Poisoning (SEP). In our study, we will 
mostly be using the term Search Engine Poisoning. 
 
There are a multitude of methods to perform Search Engine Poisoning, including taking 
control of popular websites, using the search engines' "sponsored" links to reference 
malicious sites which inject HTML code, offering documents that execute code in the 
background and so on. 
 
These descriptions also indicate the concern felt by information security practitioners over 
this phenomenon. Delivering malware to users in a corporate and private environment allows 
the criminal element to abuse the resources of the search engines in various ways, from 
keylogging to stealing banking and other personal details, to extorting money via fake anti-
virus software. 
 
With this in mind, the primary objective of the research in this thesis is then as follows: 
 
                                                        
3 http://www.imperva.com/resources/glossary/search_engine_poisoning_sep.html 
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Investigate the prevelance of Search Engine Poisoning within the top trending topics in 
modern search engines via both manual and automated methods. Doing this will depend on 
several secondary research objectives that need to be investigated, as follows: 
 
1. Firstly, to look at and investigate case studies of Search Engine Poisoning in 2011, 
particularly with regards to news events that made headlines. This was done to 
establish a baseline for the type of results that we hoped to find in the manual and 
automated research chapters. Several examples were found and explored in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
2. The second objective of the research was to look for Search Engine Poisoned sites 
using manual search methods. During this period of research several examples of 
Search Engine Poisoning were found with relative ease, and investigated in detail. 
The results were compared to historic data from academic and industry sources, and 
allowed us to make comparisons to determine behaviour changes in techniques and 
results, along with proving just how easily these campaigns still catch the average 
internet user. Manual methods will try to imitate the average user on the internet, and 
thus look at how the normal user behaves when searching for results on the internet, 
and look at the results presented to the user, including possible Search Engine 
Poisoned results. 
 
3. The third part of the research involved retrieving data over a period of seven months 
and running this collected data through various tools as described in Chapter 3. The 
collected data was then analysed for trends and the results presented. The automated 
method will harvest the top URL’s within Google’s top trends on a daily basis.  Since 
this would be near impossible to do on a manual basis, we will be relying on an 
automated method to collect and analyse this data. 
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2.Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter is discussed the research published on a number of issues related to Search 
Engine Poisoning. Studying current industry and academic research methods and findings 
allows us to position our research in relation to these other studies. Several of these studies 
take a more narrow approach than ours, focusing on fake anti-virus software, particular 
methods of web injection, or just ways to combat Search Engine Poisoning.  
 
We start with an overview of a particular form of Search Engine Poisoning in section 2.2, the 
general manipulation of search engines often referred to as “Google Bombing”. Following in 
section 2.3 is a discussion around the problems associated with web spam, a different method 
of influencing search engine rankings. This is then followed by a detailed discussion of prior 
research into the field of Search Engine Poisoning in section 2.4. 
 
2.2 Google Bombing 
 
In studying Search Engine Poisoning, one cannot ignore the phenomenon of 'Google 
Bombing'. The New Oxford American Dictionary4 defines Google Bombing as "the activity 
of designing Internet links that will bias search engine results so as to create an inaccurate 
impression of the search target"5. Hamilton [3] investigates this phenomenon, including the 
reasons why this is done, and the possible countermeasures to it.  
 
Hamilton states that Google Bombing is the action of setting many pages or sites to a single 
link, thus associating the target with a key phrase in Google's pagerank algorithm. This 
                                                        
4
 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Google+bomb 
5 http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2062070/Google-and-Google-Bombing-Now-Included-New-Oxford-
American-Dictionary 
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association is deliberately done to disrupt the accuracy of the indexing system. Dean [4] 
explains that Google’s indexing system works by partitioning the document IDs into many  
sections called shards, and each of these shards are replicated onto multiple servers. Dean 
goes on to explain that in 2001, Google switched to an in-memory index system, which has 
since been upgraded by Google in 2010 to a system that incrementally updates the index on a 
continuous basis. Even with these improvements, people are able to pull off successful 
Google bombs as we show in Figure 1. 
 
Hamilton goes on to mention the first known Google Bomb, an incident where a search query 
in 1999 — "more evil than satan himself" — returned the Microsoft homepage as its top 
result. Several other examples are also mentioned, including a 2003 incident involving the 
erstwhile president of the United States of America, George Walker Bush. Hamilton explains 
the difference between Google Bombing and Search Engine Poisoning; being that in Google 
Bombing no actual page content of the target page is ever manipulated or altered when 
targeted by a Google Bomb. A detailed timeline of well known Google Bombs is displayed in 
figure 1, based on the work of Tatum [5] and Buck [6].  
 
McNichol [7] takes a closer look at the incident where the biography of President George 
Walker Bush was manipulated under the Google search term "miserable failure" to be the 
number one link on the web. McNichol defines Google bombing; stating it is simply the act 
of taking advantage of the web-indexing mechanism that led to Google being the top search 
engine. McNichol also credits Adam Mathes, a computer science major at Stanford 
University at the time, as having coined the term 'Google bombing'.  
 
McNichol states that ever since 1995 when the first search engines appeared, people have 
tried to manipulate search results on the web. According to McNichol, what is important is 
not the number of links, but the popularity of the sites linked to the Google Bomb, and the 
relative obscurity of the term. Bryan [8] explains the mathematics behind Google’s ranking 
algorithm  and how it has progressed and been improved over time. Due to the constand 
changing environment on the web, the algorithm is also changed on a regular basis to 
accommodate for these changes. 
 
Bar-Ilan [9] looks at Google Bombing from a time perspective. Much like both Hamilton and 
Nichol, Ilan confirms that Google Bombing is a technique used to actively manipulate search 
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results. Ilan states that an entire industry has emerged that focuses on Search Engine 
Optimisation, and finds that bloggers are heavily involved in Google Bombs. Ilan's paper 
focuses on Google Bombs that were done for humour, ego, and justice, and specifically 
excludes Google Bombs that were done for financial gain. 
 
2.3 Web Spam 
 
Hayati and Potdar [10] touch on Search Engine Poisoning in a paper published in 2009 called 
"Spammer and Hacker, Two Old Friends". They define web spam as web pages that are 
created to manipulate search engines or deceive users, and deliberately trick search engines 
into offering misleading search results and then serving the malicious results to unsuspecting 
visitors to the pages. The paper goes on to explore the relationship between hackers and 
spammers, and the reasoning behind why the relationship is interdependent.  
 
The paper is a problem statement, and thus does not give conclusive methods for preventing 
Search Engine Poisoning, but does explore the reasons for both spammers and hackers using 
the technique.  
 
Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina [11] describe two different techniques associated with web 
spam. The first includes boosting techniques, i.e. “methods through which one seeks to 
achieve high relevance and/or importance for some pages”, and the second category of 
techniques includes methods for hiding the technique from the human eye. These various 
techniques can include any of the following methods: Body spam, title spam, meta tag spam, 
anchor text spam, repetition of specific terms, dumping of large numbers of unrelated terms, 
weaving of spam terms into content, and phrase stitching, which spammers use to create 
content quickly. 
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Figure 1: A timeline of important Google Bombs (based on the work of Tatum [5] and 
Buck [6]) 
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Another technique is to generate blog comments with spam, embedding links in the 
comments and loading the comments with keywords. Mishne [12] does an analysis of these 
methods used to spam comments in blogs, as well as the methods that web authors use to 
prevent it. These methods to prevent spam include registration of users wishing to post 
comments, preventing HTML in comments or requiring comment posters to solve a captcha. 
Yan [13] defines a captcha as “Completely Automated Turing Test to Tell Computers and 
Humans Apart”. 
 
Where Mishne did a comparison of methods, Thomason [14] does an analysis of the different 
vectors used for web spam. The first is the spammer blog post, a post created by the owner of 
a website or compromised account with the correct credentials on a blog. The second is the 
comment spam as described by Mishne. The third vector is the trackback spam. This is a 
server to server notification of one post that references another, via a fixed API and the 
specification makes no mention of verification, thus almost any URL can be entered in to a 
trackback comment. This allows for the linking of possibly malicious URLs without through 
the trackback method. 
 
2.4 Search Engine Poisoning 
 
Caverlee et al. [15] mention Search Engine Manipulation, also referred to as Search Engine 
Poisoning in a 2006 paper on Countering Web Spam Using Link-Based Analysis. The 
authors had already noticed that a considerable amount of malicious website spamming is 
focused on manipulating the ranking algorithms that drive search engines. These pages then 
create links to spam pages, and as technology has evolved, these spam links lead to the 
possibility of malicious exploitation of the end user.  
 
Wang et al. [16] explored investigating websites that exploit unpatched Windows XP 
systems. The investigation introduces the concept of Automated Web Patrol, an attempt 
which aims to significantly reduce the cost of monitoring malicious web sites in an attempt to 
protect internet users. The research goes on to study a number of websites through the use of 
several versions of Microsoft Windows XP, reporting on the number of exploits found while 
crawling the web through the automated web crawling mechanism. Wang et al. further find 
that the major exploit providers own many of the top level sites visited during the malware 
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study. One owner of three of the top level sites was found to have a redirect relationship with 
61 other exploit sites.  
 
Finally Wang et al. look at three groups of interest. Firstly, a group of sites that consists of 
sites with  front-ends that appear to be normal e-commerce sites, that redirect to sites that 
serve exploits via URLs, which in turn are hosted by five advertising companies. The second 
group that Wang et al. look at is URLs serving screen savers. Wang et al. claim that many 
freeware programs bundle spyware in to their installation files, as well as freeware sites 
actually installing spyware through exploits. The third group of sites consists of malicious 
search sites, and Wang et al. found more than twenty search sites in their list of exploit URLs. 
The researchers also looked at what percentage of the exploit URLs they gathered was found 
in popular search engines such as Yahoo! and Google. The results proved that over 13% of 
the exploit URLs were served in results by the search engines, which,  as stated by the 
researchers, "is not a trivial percentage". Our research will explore this third phenomenon 
more deeply.  
 
John et al. [17] developed a system called deSEO for identifying and protecting against 
Search Engine Poisoning attacks. As mentioned in Wang et al., John et al. found the same 
attack patterns. These attacks compromise legitimate web servers and generate a large 
number of fake web pages. John et al. find that by using the ranking algorithms used by 
popular search engines through Search Engine Optimisation techniques, the attackers are able 
to poison the search result for popular terms or trends, and thus send users to links with 
malicious content. The use of the search engines gives the attacker a low cost and legitimate 
looking appearance. Since the findings of John et al. are the same as Wang et al. in that the 
sites are mostly based on compromised web servers, the attacks also ride on the reputation of 
the compromised server.  
 
John et al.’s [17] study suggests that there are two important requirements for a Search 
Engine Poisoning attack to work: The use of multiple trending keywords, and generation of 
relevant content across a large number of pages. John et al. also explore cloaking techniques 
used by attackers to hide the poisoned search engine content from search engine crawlers. 
The researchers find that there are also three major components in a Search Engine Poisoning 
attack: The compromised web servers, the redirection servers, and the exploit servers.  
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During the research done by John et al. they also found that most of the keyphrases used by 
the Search Engine Poisoning sites are obtained from Google's 'hot trends' and Bing's 'related 
searches'. John et al. conclude why the attacks are successful: The attackers generate pages 
with relevant content, target multiple search keywords to increase coverage, and create dense 
link structures to boost the page ranking.  
 
Leontiadis et al. [18] investigated the use and manipulation of search engines in the 
promotion of the unauthorised sale of prescription drugs. The researchers constructed a 
representative list of drug-related queries and gathered search results for a nine month period, 
focusing their research on a variant of Search Engine Manipulation involving compromised 
web servers, instead of the email spam that these online retailers have relied on for a long 
time. The research goes on to show that Search Engine Manipulation is becoming the attack 
of choice for online criminal operations. Leontiadis et al. also go on to explore the techniques 
of 'link stuffing' and how criminals use certain 'cloaking' measures to hide the fact that the 
site has been compromised from the valid owners, as also explored by John et al.  
 
Leontiadis et al. also note an important difference in their research, which sets it apart from 
the research performed in this thesis. Very often the victims are not victims of 'drive-by 
downloads' but rather users actively looking for illegal pharmaceutical products.  
 
In their detailed paper, Howard and Komili [19] state that malware distribution through 
Search Engine Poisoning is “beautiful in its simplicity”. They detail the use of Search Engine 
Optimisation kits (usually written in PHP) to create web pages filled with keywords that are 
topical at the time, and, as such, will be crawled by the web search engines. The SEO kits 
rely on on using content that users are actively seeking on the internet. While the method of 
distribution of malware works without being stopped, there is little need for the malware 
authors and distributors to change the method. The paper focuses on how SEO is used in a 
negative context to improve the rankings of sites serving malware, how the malware authors 
use the methods often published by search engines on how to improve ranking in order to 
improve their own rankings, and the many ways that users are redirected once they have 
landed at an SEO poisoned website.  
 
Methods of hiding SEO attacks within legitimate sites are shown (the researchers found that 
all but one of the sites they investigated were hosted within legitimate sites), as well as how 
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links are posted on legitimate sites via user comments and the like to increase the ranking of 
the page. Howard and Komili show the relationship between hidden SEO kits and 
compromised content management systems, e.g. Joomla!, WordPress, phpBB and 
MediaWiki. Analysis of the SEO kits also show how content is dynamically generated, using 
search engines to source the relevant text for page content. Howard and Komili state that 
during their research they have seen both the Google and Bing search engines used by the 
SEO kits, and show the steps of the SEO pages as they are generated by the kits.  
 
Having seen how malware can be distributed through SEO poisoning in the Howard and 
Komili paper, Caballero et al. [20] look at commoditisation of malware distribution — in 
other words, turning the distribution of malware into a business, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
In a series of articles on the ZDnet website [21] [22] [23], Ed Bott looks at the phenomenon 
of Search Engine Poisoning. In the first article [21], the author shows a fairly common 
infection vector for malware distribution. The author describes what happens when the 
software is downloaded and installed, as well as how to identify the software once it has been 
installed on a PC. Bott then examines, in an August 8th, 2011 article [22], how the Bing 
search engine served malware to the user when it did a search for specific phrases that were 
poisoned. As found in previous papers by Howard and Komili, and Leontiadis et al., Bott 
finds there is a strong connection between the redirection of the malware or poisoned site and 
online pharmaceutical sites, as well as other less desirable content being served. Bott also 
does an analysis of the downloaded file and provides interesting feedback, which we will 
look at later in this thesis.  
 
Bott further explores [23] the prevalence of Search Engine Poisoning by searching for several 
key phrases and following poisoned links to sites that serve malware under the pretence of 
being legitimate software downloads. Bott identifies that the SEO kit used by the malware 
writers uses a polymorphic engine for the files, which was not detected at the time of writing 
of the research article. Newsome et al. [24] define polymorphism as a way “through which a 
program may encode and re-encode itself into successive, different byte strings, enabling 
production of changing payloads”. 
 
Research into SEO poisoning is not limited to academic institutions. Blue Coat, a company 
that specialises in web security and network optimisation released several SEO findings in 
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their 2011 Web Security Report [25]. Blue Coat states that during 2010, the methods of 
delivering malware on the web migrated to trusted domains, through hacking or 
compromised credentials. This is done specifically to rely on the trust and reputation that the 
hacked domain has. Blue Coat also finds that what makes SEO poisoning such an effective 
method of crime and malware delivery is human interest and the fate of others, and that the 
defences that monitor websites are often blind to the threats hidden in legitimate sites.  
 
Blue Coat [26] confirmed what Bott, Howard and Komili all found, that fake anti-virus 
accounts for 60% of malware found on the domains that use SEO poisoning. Blue Coat 
researchers found that SEO kits place parts of their infrastructure all over hacked and 
reputable domains and websites to avoid detection. This challenges web protection measures 
that rely on reputation since trusted sites are now part of a method referred to as 'dynamic 
link chains'. Link farms then continue to hide in trusted domains and poison search engine 
results.  
 
Larsen [27], a researcher at Blue Coat, also reports via an explanatory graphic in Figure 2 that 
search engine poisoning was the most prevalent method of delivering web users to sites that 
deliver malware. 
 
 
Figure 2: The origin of malware attacks, Larsen [27] 
 
The blue line represents the average percentage of where malware attacks originated. As can 
be seen from this graphic, Larsen and the researchers at Blue Coat found that nearly forty 
percent of all malware attacks orginate from Search Engine Poisoning attacks, with e-mail, 
social networking, and other unrated origins accounting for the rest.  
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An interesting part of this graph shows how little impact pornography has on the spread of 
malware and malware networks. This can be attributed to the fact that pornographic websites 
already have an established source of revenue, and thus don’t want to endanger that source by 
being associated with the spread of malware. 
 
While Bott investigated some of the malware distributed through SEO poisoning, touching on 
the subject of fake anti-virus, Rajab et al. [28] analysed fake anti-virus distributions in detail. 
This trend is confirmed in a white paper published by the Lionic Corporation [29] in March 
2011. They find that the bulk of the poisoned pages found during their research were used to 
send users to fake anti-virus pages, trying to persuade users to install the fake anti-virus 
software. We look at this paper purely because of some of the statistical value that it provides 
in SEO poisoning and the impact it has on the fake anti-virus industry.  
 
Firstly, Rajab et al. find that during their research period of 13 months, the percentage of 
infected domains offering fake anti-virus increased from 3% to 15%. The researchers also 
found that in March 2009 the ratio of fake anti-virus domains to landing pages (SEO pages) 
was approximately 96:1. Another finding by Rajab et al. is that distributors of fake anti-virus 
are more successful at targeting domains and trending keywords than distributors of other 
types of malware. Finally, Rajab et al show that fake anti-virus malware at the time of writing 
their paper accounted for 15% of all the malware they identified.  
 
Fisher [30] reported on an SEO campaign that appeared in October 2011 via the Microsoft 
Bing search engine. Users searching for Adobe Flash downloads are led via the techniques 
discussed earlier to a compromised website, where a trojan masking as the executable file 
users are looking for is downloaded. The executable is a piece of malware known as 
ZeroAccess Trojan. This confirms what the Blue Coat report and Bott found during their 
research, and proves that SEO poisoning is still a very effective method for delivering 
malware to unsuspecting users. 
 
Clay [31] reported that McAfee, in their 2012 annual report on the most dangerous web 
celebrities, ranked Emma Watson as the most dangerous celebrity to search for online, with a 
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12% chance of getting infected with malware. Watson6 gained fame as the female lead in the 
Harry Potter series of movies, playing the character of ‘Hermione Granger’. In the previous 
year, model Heidi Klum topped the annual McAfee list.. 
 
Leydon [32] reported that a study by Sophos Labs found that the Microsoft Bing search 
engine was the most heavily poisoned search engine compared to others. The article reported 
that 65% of the poisoned results originated from the Bing search engine, while only 30% 
came from Google. The article also reports that 92% of the blocked results come as a result of 
image searches, and only 8% from text searches. Howard Fraser from Sophos Labs reports 
that search engines continuously play a cat and mouse game, and that the search engines are 
not always successful.  
 
2.5 Summary 
  
From the research papers to industry reports studied in this literature review, we can see that 
one thing is obvious: Search Engine Poisoning, in one form or another, is a phenomenon that 
has been with the search engine industry since the beginning. Hamilton [3] showed us that 
Google as a search engine was only a year old before the first type of search record 
manipulation took place, while Larsen [27] has shown us that it is still the primary way to 
deliver malware to a victim’s computer. 
 
Commercial research from McAfee [31], Sophos Labs [19] and BlueCoat [27] [26], as well 
as academic research have showed us the relationship between the criminal elements on the 
internet, and their need to manipulate the results of search engines. Research from Fisher [30] 
as well as Bott [21] [22] [23] shows the methods used by the various elements, and the end-
goal of these elements, be it malware installations, fake anti-virus or even more harmful 
payloads. 
 
In the next chapter the research approach in this thesis is discussed, including the case studies 
that are studied, the manual and automated data gathering methods and the subsequent data 
analysis that will be performed.   
                                                        
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emma_watson 
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3.Research Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
While the research in the literature review focused on methods of Search Engine Poisoning as 
done by Howard and Komili [19], the fake anti-virus industry and the link to Search Engine 
Poisoning studied by the Lionic Corporation [29], or the pushing of prescription drugs via 
online sales done by Leontiadis et al. [18] among others, the research conducted in this thesis 
will focus on three distinctive areas in a three part discussion.  
 
Firstly, case studies relevant to the thesis will be studied in Chapter 4 in order to explain the 
phenomenon of Search Engine Poisoning and why it is still so effective today. In this section, 
the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Amy Winehouse are studied, as well as a smaller SEP 
campaign relating to a different news making event, where a teacher named Ileana Tacconelli 
was fired from her job, and this made news to such an extent that it caught the attention of the 
criminal elements that operate the SEP campaigns. 
 
The second part of our research in Chapter 6 will focus on the human element, searching the 
internet manually, looking at terms which have been classified as dangerous, and seeing what 
results can be gathered in such a way. These results are then run through five different virtual 
machines and the results are collected and analysed and studied to see the effects of normal 
Search Engine Poisoning on the normal internet user. 
 
The third part of the research approach in Chapter 7 focuses on automated searching, 
gathering data in an automated fashion, and logging and storing the data for analysis via 
various tools available. Data is collected via a virtual private server that was rented in a data 
centre, on a daily basis, and this data is then processed through automated tools, and the 
results analysed. The data that has been collected over the time period is then analysed for 
patterns, and interrogated for results and conclusions drawn from said data. 
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3.2  Case Studies 
 
During 2011 there was a host of case studies that have been exploited in Search Engine 
Poisoning attacks. These include, but are not limited to, the deaths of Osama bin Laden, Amy 
Winehouse, Steve Jobs and Muammar Gaddafi. All of these high profile deaths were 
followed by some form of Search Engine Poisoning attack.  
 
The aim of the research is to look into these high profile deaths, analyse the time frame from 
incident to the first reported case of search engine poisoning, and to look at which attack 
avenue was used in the attack, be it social media, image poisoning or a normal Search Engine 
Poisoning attack via web links contaminated with malware. Chapter 4 will also show graphs 
of the searches for information on the case studies, and these give a clear indication of the 
search volume for information around the news event, and why these events became the 
focus for Search Engine Poison campaign operators. 
 
A good example is the Kaspersky Blog post that followed the Osama bin Laden death7 and 
the subsequent images that were search engine poisoned. The images redirected to rogue anti-
virus sites that offered a well known fake anti-virus program called 'Best Antivirus 2011'. 
Each of the four celebrity deaths mentioned had a Search Engine Poisoning campaign 
attached to it, thus allowing us a good base to search and extract data from.  
 
Not only celebrity deaths will be looked at, but also other news events which have had a 
search engine poisoning campaign attached to them. Each of the case studies will show a 
different method of manipulating search engines with a different aim in the end, though one 
could come to the conclusion that the ultimate aim of all the search engine manipulators are 
monetary benefit in some form or another. 
 
3.3  Manual Searching 
 
The next avenue to look at during the research is manual searching. We aim to look at the 
popular ways that search engine poisoning have taken place in the past and then simply 
follow the same methods to look at finding pages that have been the victims of search engine 
                                                        
7 http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/6202/Blackhat_SEO_and_Osama_Bin_Laden_s_death 
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poisoning.  
 
McAfee named Heidi Klum as the most dangerous celebrity on the web for 2011 [33] , and 
Hope Dworaczyk, a former Playboy Playmate was awarded the title of ‘Miss Malware’ [34] 
at the Defcon 18 conference in 2010. This focus on celebrities being used in Search Engine 
Poisoning campaigns is used as the starting point for the manual searching that is used in this 
thesis. Part of the research will be to look at campaigns launched by malicious SEO 
operators, and impersonating the average user while searching the web for exactly what 
McAfee has identified, and hoping that it leads us to a poisoned search result, thus allowing 
us to become ‘victims’ of the attack.  
 
This methodology differs from the automated searching discussed in the next part in that 
human behaviour can be very different to the behaviour programmed into a piece of software 
or a script running every few hours, even if a low interaction honey client is used (as 
discussed in section 3.4.3). 
 
Part of the research methodology will also be to look at how good Google’s ‘safe search’ 
function is when looking for images using Google’s Google Images search function. Larsen 
[26] has reported that the ‘safe search’ option of Google’s algorithm is fairly easily bypassed, 
and thus we will look at how easy it is for Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators to 
bypass this feature. 
 
3.4  Automated Searching 
 
A substantial part of the searching for search engine poisoned web pages was done using 
automated searching. The idea for the automated part of the research came from Moore et al 
[35], who noted that on 24 February 2011 Google changed rankings in its search engine 
algorithm to eradicate low-quality results. Moore defines low quality sites as “low-value add 
for users, copy content from other websites or sites that are just not very useful”. Moore 
found that a lot of search engine poisoned sites fall under this. Our research commences after 
these changes were carried out by Google, and we should see if the changes have been 
effective or not. 
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The first part of this comprises historical data that gathered for Google Trends for the last 
three years, collected into a database and analysed for content and links. These trends should 
give us more insight into the history of certain trends, and allow us to collate data collected 
with Search Engine Poisoning campaigns in the past.  
 
Matching data collected with historical campaigns allows us to look at possible response 
times to news by black hat SEO operators, and allows us to view what malware types have 
been offered or pushed onto unsuspecting internet users. This is especially interesting since 
the takedown of the Russian payment processor Chronopay, and its links to rogue anti-virus 
products8. We do this because of the link that the fake anti-virus products vendors have with 
the Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators as pointed out earlier by both the Lionic 
Corporation [29] and Rajab et el [28]. 
 
The second part of the automated searching comprises a large part of this research paper. The 
process of collection will simply be gathering the Google Trends on a daily basis, following 
each trend, gathering the top 10 URLs for the trend, and logging this into a database. This 
data gathering period will happen for seven months, from 1 February 2012 to 1 September 
2012 during the thesis writing period, giving us data for at least seven months of 2012. 
 
The URLs gathered will then be run through various engines and API’s in order to perform 
automated testing for any malware, cross-site scripting, malicious javascript, or silent 
malware downloads. 
 
3.4.1 JSunpack 
 
The first tool that will be used for automated URL processing is ‘jsunpack’. The ‘jsunpack’ 
[36] tool is a Python script for detecting and analysing malicious JavaScript embedded in 
websites. It emulates web browser functionality when visiting a web site and tries to detect 
browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities. 
 
Using the 'jsunpack'9 tool each URL will then be tested for malicious javascript via 
                                                        
8
 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/reports/rpt_a-look-back-at-
2011_information-is-currency.pdf 
9 http://code.google.com/p/jsunpack-n/ 
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automated scripting, and the result logged to a database for further analysis. The tool also 
allows us to interrogate Adobe .pdf documents which may contain malicious code embedded 
in the document. 
 
3.4.2 VirusTotal 
 
The second service used in this thesis for testing the status of a web page being retrieved 
from the Google top trends list is the VirusTotal10 service. 
 
As per the definition on their homepage, “VirusTotal is a free service that analyses suspicious 
files and URLs and facilitates the quick detection of viruses, worms, trojans and all kinds of 
malware”. 
 
The VirusTotal API allows us to run the daily collected URLs through a limited API, and 
query the status of the URLs at a later stage. VirusTotal in return collects data from twenty-
six different web security providers and forty-one anti-virus providers allowing us to get a 
holistic view of the status of submitted websites without the need to interface with multiple 
vendors and databases. While the list is by no means complete, it allows us to get enough 
information to warrant further investigation into an identified URL or file. 
 
3.4.3 Thug 
 
The third automated method for testing for malicious sites through the Google Trends data 
gathering will be Thug [37]. Thug is a low interaction honey client that will be used to 
analyse sites that are collected via both automated data collection and manual searches. 
Qassrawi and Zhang [38] define a honey client as “an active honeypot that mimics, either 
manually or automatically, the normal series of steps a regular user would make when 
visiting various websites”. 
 
Based on the research done by Seifert et al. [39], it was decided to use a low intensity honey 
client instead of a high interaction honey client to analyse the data gathered, as high 
                                                        
10 https://www.virustotal.com 
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interaction honey clients are time and resource consuming. Seifert et al. also point to the fact 
that high interaction honey clients also look at other means of attack, while the research 
presented here focuses on search engine poisoning attacks via malicious or compromised web 
sites; thus the need for such a high interaction honey client would be excessive and produce 
too much non-relevant data. 
 
A detailed diagram and description of the test environment used is presented in section 6.1.1. 
 
3.5  Data Analysis 
 
Once a malicious site has been found that was created and indexed in Google through Search 
Engine Poisoning, the next step in the research is to analyse the content of the malicious 
website. This will be done using several virtual machines, each containing a different version 
of Microsoft Windows (e.g. Windows XP Service Pack 2 versus Windows XP Service Pack 
3), and in addition containing several patch levels and different versions of Internet Explorer 
(e.g. Internet Explorer 6 versus Internet Explorer 8).  
 
While visiting the malicious URLs with the virtual machines, analysis of software 
downloaded either covertly or willingly will be done, as well as looking at the effect the 
website might have had on the machine.  
 
By analysing the software downloaded, statistics can be gathered on the type of software that 
was installed, as well as classification of the possible malicious software found. Analysis of 
these statistics and detail can also provide insight into the origins of a campaign, and the 
objective of the campaign operators, be it fake anti-virus advertisement, compromising a 
computer to become a botnet client, or installing malware or ransomware. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
While the research methodology is by no means unique, previous research into Search Engine 
Poisoning has focused on specific areas such as the fake anti-virus industry, and did not use 
data specifically collected from Google’s top trends over an extended period of time, nor 
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emulate normal user behaviour on the internet. 
 
The methodology used in this thesis thus differs as we will be gathering the top Google 
trending data over an extended time period and analysing it. In this way, we aim to find out 
how effective the campaigns by the Search Engine Poisoning operators are, and if they are 
indeed managing to get into the Google trending list through both manual and automated 
search methods, as previously defined on page 3.  
 
Lastly, we will also see how effective Google and Bing are in detecting and preventing 
Search Engine Poisoning campaigns, both in its Google trending data, and in normal searches 
by users looking for specific topics on the internet. 
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4.Case Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Durkin [40] studies the human fascination with death and dying in the paper ‘Death, Dying 
and the Dead in popular culture’. The paper explores our preoccupation with death in 
television, cinema, music, print media, recreation, jokes, and other aspects of popular culture. 
Durkin describes the term ‘post self’ and how it is especially true for celebrities. The term 
references the ability of the person to influence, and the reputation the celebrity has after their 
death. Durkin describes it thus: “the post self constitutes a form of symbolic immortality, 
whereby the meaning of a person can continue after he or she has died”.  
 
This virtual immortality through meaning can be seen in true effect when we look at the death 
of Osama bin Laden, and the meaning that this event has had to the world. This will be 
explored further in section 4.2. During 2011 there were several celebrity deaths, and their 
‘post self’ was even seen on the internet, when people were looking for as much information 
as possible surrounding the death of the celebrities — what caused it and how did it happen? 
This ‘post self’ of the celebrity deaths did not escape the eyes of the Search Engine Poisoning 
campaign operators. 
 
As previously mentioned, during 2011 there were several concentrated Search Engine 
Poisoning campaigns focusing on a certain celebrity death, and in this section we will look at 
those centred around these deaths. A brief biography of each celebrity will be given in order 
to give the reader a clear understanding of why the celebrity death was important, and more 
so why the celebrity death was important to the Search Engine Poisoning campaigners. 
 
To avoid focusing just on celebrity deaths and the Search Engine Poisoning campaigns 
around it, we also look at other smaller campaigns  relating to other news events, and the 
objectives of such a campaign. 
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Google provides us with two very good tools for studying search history for certain terms or 
topics, and have collated data going back to 2004. These tools are Google Trends11 and 
Google Insights for Search12. One of the features that will be prominently used during this 
chapter is the ability of these services to actively graph the search terms for a time period. 
This will provide an easy to understand visual explanation of how the search term escalated 
during the news event, and how people's searches for the event tapered off after the event. It 
is important to remember that the Search Engine Poisoning kits look for these high ranking 
search topics and then try to poison the searches. Thus we look at these historical events and 
their search rankings, as well as the Search Engine Poisoning campaigns that followed.  
 
It should be noted that the other major search engines on the internet, namely Microsoft's 
Bing and Yahoo! Search do not offer the ability to study and graph the major search terms 
from a historical perspective. Yahoo! does have a service called Yahoo! Buzz13, but it does 
not allow for the comprehensive historical search that Google does at the time this thesis was 
written.  
 
In the following section we will look at the deaths of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and 
singer Amy Winehouse, and the controversy surrounding a school teacher named Ileana 
Tacconelli, as well as the associated Search Engine Poisoning campaigns that followed these 
news events. Graphs that show the rise and fall of the search terms for the case studies will be 
shown, as well as for associated terms that users on the internet searched for.  
4.2 Osama bin Laden 
 
 
Osama bin Laden rose to public prominence as the leader of the terrorist organisation Al-
Qaeda. Born in July 1957, he was the son of a construction magnate, and went to Afghanistan 
in 1979 during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, Bin Laden 
moved to Sudan and started training Al-Qaeda militants [41]. 
 
                                                        
11 http://www.google.com/trends/ 
12 http://www.google.com/insights/search/ 
13 http://buzzlog.yahoo.com/ 
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In this position, bin Laden masterminded the attacks on two American embassies in Africa on 
August 7, 1998: One in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and one in Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks 
were followed by a suicide attack on the United States Navy destroyer the USS Cole, while it 
was berthed in the port of Aden in Yemen [42]. Osama bin Laden then masterminded and 
was responsible for the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 [43].  
 
To understand why this attack, and the subsequent hunt for and eventual finding of Osama 
bin Laden was of such interest to the world and why it was chosen as one of the case studies 
for this thesis, we need to look at some numbers. Bock [44] reports that the September 11, 
2001 attacks led to the largest loss of life in a single event since the Pearl Harbour attack in 
World War II. A total of 2,977 American civilians and 19 terrorists lost their lives in the 
attacks.  
 
Bock also reports that before the World Trade Center attacks, the largest loss from a single 
event covered by United States insurance companies was Hurricane Andrew. The claims 
associated with the World Trade Center and accompanying events exceeded fifty billion US 
dollars.  
 
These statistics show the enormity of the impact that this attack had, and as such, why the 
capture of Osama bin Laden became one of the biggest targets for the United States of 
America. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had Osama bin Laden on their top ten terrorist 
wanted list, offering a reward of USD 25,000,00014.  
 
On May 2, 2011, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, authorised a raid in 
Pakistan by United States Navy Seals [45] which ultimately led to the capture and killing of 
Osama bin Laden. As president Obama announced to the world that Osama bin Laden had 
been killed, the news went viral on television and news networks worldwide. This obviously 
also included the internet.  
  
                                                        
14 http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/usama-bin-laden 
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4.2.1  Google Trends and Insights 
 
As the news of Osama bin Laden's death spread throughout the world, people searched on the 
internet for news: Confirmation that it had really happened, and as much information as 
possible regarding the circumstances surrounding his death. When looking at the Google 
Trends data for the search term 'osama bin laden', a marked increase in searches can be seen 
following the news of his death.  
  
 
Figure  3: Google Trends showing the sudden rise in searches for 'Osama bin Laden' 
  
The letters in the graphic are Google links to articles, and can not be eliminated from the 
picture easily. In order to have a closer look (without article links), we look towards Google 
Insights for Search. 
 
 
Figure  4: Google Insights for Search showing the sudden rise in searches for 'Osama 
bin Laden' 
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In Figure 4 it can be seen that there is a massive spike in the amount of searches for 'osama 
bin laden' during May (the time of his death), and a minor rise during mid September 2011 
when more news regarding the death of Osama bin Laden was released. It needs to be noted 
that all of the graphs presented in this thesis are historical datasets that Google allows to 
query, and this data was not being collected realtime for this thesis. 
4.2.2  The Search Engine Poisoning Campaign 
 
This increase in searches for news about the death of Osama bin Laden did not escape the 
sights of the Search Engine Poisoning engine operators, and within hours of the news, several 
information security companies were reporting poisoning campaigns related to the death of 
Osama bin Laden, as the searches for news were being poisoned.  
 
The Search Engine Poisoning campaigns took on several different manifestations. Some of 
the campaigns focused on getting the users to spread it themselves via crude methods on 
social networking sites, while others tried to trick users into installing fake anti-virus 
software. In the following section a closer examination of the various methods will be done.  
 
Assolini [46] reports on a campaign that inserted fake images of Osama bin Laden's body into 
Google Images. Once the unsuspecting user clicked on the links, they were taken to fake anti-
virus websites. When the user landed on the page, they were offered a copy of a well known 
fake anti-virus known as "Best Antivirus 2011", as the screenshot in Figure 5 shows. 
 
Another way in which the black hat operators capitalised on the death of Osama bin Laden 
was via Facebook. Cluley [47] reports that the users received a post on their profile claiming 
to have a link to a video that contained the last minutes of Osama bin Laden's life, as shown 
in Figure 6. 
 
Once the user clicked on the link, they were then asked to perform a few simple tasks, before 
being able to watch the video. Once the user clicked on the video, they were taken to a survey 
to complete, instead of the video. Cluley reports that the operators of the scam earned money 
for every survey completed, thus the attraction of capitalising on Osama bin Laden's death. 
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Figure 5. An example of the fake anti-virus program Best Antivirus 2011 [46] 
 
Figure 6. An example of the scam on Facebook used by Search Engine Poisoning 
operators [47]. 
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Looking at just these two examples, we can see that various scams were rife very soon after 
the death of Osama bin Laden, all driven by the search for information surrounding the 
circumstances of his death. 
4.2.3 Summary 
 
The finding and subsequent killing of Osama bin Laden after a ten year search was going to 
make headline news throughout the world, and such a large news event proved to be the 
perfect springboard for various Search Engine Poisoning campaigns as we have explored in 
this section.  
 
Various fake news items, fake pictures and Facebook campaigns tried to lure and trick people 
in to clicking on links or pictures in order to compromise their computers and to try spread 
the campaigns further. During the study presented, we looked at how the search requests for 
information regarding bin Laden’s death rose, and the different ways how poisoning through 
links and Facebook campaigns happened. What is clear is that even in his death, Osama bin 
Laden did live on as described by Durkin [40]. 
4.3 Amy Winehouse 
 
Amy Winehouse was born Amy Jade Winehouse on September 14, 1983 in London [48]. 
From an early age she showed musical talent, and in 2003 released her first album ‘Frank’, 
followed in 2006 by her second album ‘Back to Black’.  
 
Shaw et al. [49] and McRobbie [50] both report on the drug and alcohol problems that Amy 
Winehouse had, and on 23 July 2011 Amy Winehouse died from blood alcohol poisoning 
[51]. No sooner had the news of her death reached the mainstream media, than the operators 
of the Search Engine Poisoning campaigns started poisoning searches for Amy Winehouse. 
 
4.3.1 Google Trends and Insights 
 
As the news of Amy Winehouse’s death was reported, people went onto search engines and 
started searching for news about it. Looking at the Google Trends and Google Insights 
information for the date range related to Amy Winehouse’s death, we can see why this was 
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again a very good target for the Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators to use. 
 
 
Figure  7: Google Trends showing the sudden rise in searches for 'Amy Winehouse 
death' 
There is a marked increase for searches regarding her death from the time the news was 
released until after her funeral, as shall be explained with the following graphs (Figure 7 and 
Figure 8). 
 
As per the Osama Bin Laden searches shown earlier, a marked increase in searches related to 
the news items can be seen for the time period related to Amy Winehouse’s death. 
 
 
Figure  8: Google Insights for Search showing the sudden rise in searches for ‘Amy 
Winehouse death’ 
As can be seen from the graphic in Figure 8, there is a marked increase in the searches for 
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any information regarding the death of Amy Winehouse during the time of her death. Due to 
the details surrounding her death being vague at the time, the period reflected in the searches 
is a bit longer than with the Osama Bin Laden search, and the searches only taper off after her 
funeral. 
 
4.3.2 The Search Engine Poisoning Campaign 
 
Once the death of Amy Winehouse reached the mainstream media, the Search Engine 
Poisoning campaign operators started their campaigns. The primary medium targeted initially 
was Facebook, with various scams operating in much the same way as with Osama Bin 
Laden’s death. 
 
Users searching for images of Amy Winehouse were lured into clicking on fake pictures or 
videos of Amy Winehouse under various headings, including “SHOCKING – Amy 
Winehouse’s Final Minutes” and “Leaked Video!! Amy Winehouse On Crack hours before 
death” as shown in Figure 9. As Durkin described earlier, users have a fascination with 
celebrities and death, and thus it was easy for the scammers to lure people into clicking on 
these pictures or videos. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Examples of the Amy Winehouse Facebook scam [52] 
 
The scam worked the same as with Osama Bin Laden’s death, where people are lured into 
clicking on the picture or video heading and then asked to complete a survey before seeing 
the video or pictures. The scammers get paid for every survey completed and thus capitalise 
on people’s curiosity. 
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The SEP campaign was not just limited to social media, with Ragan [53] reporting that email 
was sent by spammers containing an attachment that claimed to be video of Amy Winehouse 
moments before her death. The email attachment contained a compressed file, containing the 
SpyEye Trojan15. 
 
Lumague [52] also reports of a scam where the search string ‘amy winehouse death’ entered 
in to search engines led users to malicious links, which in turn redirected the users to sites 
hosting malware. The particular malware or malicious file in this instance was a fake anti-
virus program16 (a relationship which we have explored earlier already). 
 
Just as with the death of Osama bin Laden, we see that the operators of the Search Engine 
Poisoning campaigns use various methods, from social media to normal link poisoning, in 
order to get users to visit the poisoned link, and thus profit in some way from it. 
4.3.3 Summary 
 
The Amy Winehouse case study presented in this section showed us that the world is still 
obsessed with celebrities, even after they have left us, and they continue in their ‘post self’ as 
described by Durkin [40]. With Amy Winehouse’s death, it gave the Search Engine 
Poisoning campaign owners another opportunity to try and lure people in to clicking on fake 
Facebook pictures or to convince them to click on links or video files that could lead to the 
compromise of their systems. As with the Osama bin Laden case study, the prevalence of 
social media is again high in the methods that the operators of these campaigns use. 
4.4 Ileana Tacconelli 
 
Pisa [54] reports on the former model Ileana Tacconelli, a teacher at the San Carlo Catholic 
School in Milan, who caused a storm when racy pictures of her were posted on the internet. 
 
Ileana Tacconelli won a regional beauty contest in Italy [55], crowning her Miss Abruzzo, 
and entered the national competition for Miss Italy, after which she studied at university to 
obtain a teaching degree. Having taught at the school for three years, the publication of the 
                                                        
15
 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/247252/spyeye_malware_borrows_zeus_trick_to_mask_fra
ud.html 
16 http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/Malware.aspx?language=us&name=TROJ_FAKEAV.CLS 
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photos caused some parents to remove their children from the school, and the story ultimately 
reached the mainstream news. 
 
4.4.1 Google Trends and Insights 
 
Once news hit of Miss Tacconelli, people immediately went to the search engines to find out 
who she is and what the fuss was about. Reyes [56] reported that because the articles reported 
that she was published in rather revealing photos, the image search feature in Google was 
also quite heavily used. As was reported by Assolini [46] in the Osama bin Laden case, these 
images can also be used to either redirect a user to a malicious site, or directly infect the 
visiting computer. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Google Trends showing the sudden rise in searches for 'Ileana Tacconelli' 
 
The news articles about Illeana Tacconelli reached the internet on the 21st of October 2010 
and the Google Trends in figure 8 show an immediate search increase for the search term in 
Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Google Insights for Search showing the sudden rise in searches for 'Ileana 
Tacconelli' 
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An interesting observation is that Google Insights for Search reported that the top search 
terms for Ileana Tacconelli during the time period were actually ‘video ileana tacconelli’ and 
‘ileana tacconelli movie’. This differs slightly from the trends we have seen earlier, where the 
exact search terms used in the SEP campaigns did not differ from the terms in Google Search. 
 
4.4.2 The Search Engine Poisoning Campaign  
 
Reyes reported that one of the interesting facts about the search engine poisoning campaign 
around Ileana Tacconelli was the relatively small size of the news event. This did not deter 
the Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators, and soon after the news articles were 
published, poisoned Google Images started appearing, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Google Images search showing the poisoned images [56] 
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Reyes reported that once a user clicked on one of the poisoned images, the user was 
redirected to several sites and then prompted with a display claiming that their version of 
Adobe Flash Player was out of date and needed updating as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Screenshot of the fake Adobe Flash Player update [56] 
Once downloaded and executed, the file is actually part of the TDSS rootkit. Goodin [57] 
reports that the TDSS rootkit first appeared in 2008, and is constantly updated. Goodin also 
states that the rootkit is particularly effective, in that it has a built-in encryption scheme that 
prevents the monitoring of communication between the infected PC and the control servers. 
 
An interesting difference in this search engine poisoning campaign was the fact that this 
campaign was aimed purely at gaining more hosts for the botnet, whereas the other case 
studies in this document were victim to survey scams and installing fake anti-virus software. 
It is clear that Search Engine Poisoning is used by cyber criminals for various different 
attacks through various different media including normal internet searches, image searches, 
and social media. 
 
4.4.3 Summary 
 
As has been shown in this section, the Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators not only 
rely on the death of a public figure or a celebrity to launch a campaign. The Ileana Tacconelli 
campaign is a good example of how the operators of these campaigns also focus on sexual 
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curiosity to lure victims to click on pictures or links. By posting pictures of the subject in a 
state of undress, it piques the interest of those who might want to see more of the subject and 
thus lures them to the campaign. In this case, also offering a video was another attempt at 
luring victims, and obtaining botnet victims as described by Goodin [57]. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
Looking at the three examples that were studied in this chapter, it becomes clear that current 
news items, celebrity deaths and even the smaller headlines can be targets for those operating 
Search Engine Poisoning campaigns. 
 
The goals and objectives of those running the campaigns vary slightly; some being survey 
scams, and others trying to obtain more hosts for a botnet network. It is clear though, that 
they all operate by exploiting human curiosity — the very curiosity Durkin [40] mentions —
for their own profit at the expense of normal internet users. 
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5.Browser Exploit Packs 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Villeneuve states [58] that “Cybercriminals use distribution methods such as spamming and 
black hat search engine optimization (BHSEO) techniques, often in conjunction with exploit 
packs that can take advantage of vulnerabilities in popular software in order to distribute 
malware to unsuspecting Internet users.”  
 
According to Sood and Enbody [59] “Browser Exploit Packs thrive by exploiting the 
browsers’ vulnerabilities, and attackers have demonstrated a lot of maturity and expertise in 
developing their exploits. BEPs are usually used in conjunction with botnets and use drive-
by-download attacks to load the malware binary onto the victim’s machine.” 
 
With this in mind it is important that research be done into how these attacks take place, what 
tools are being used by criminal elements, and how these tools work, as this has direct 
influence on our research into Search Engine Poisoning. These are the very tools used in SEP 
campaigns. Thus in this chapter we will look at the various exploit kits that exist, as well as 
some of the earlier kits used by criminals trying to exploit browser and operating system 
vulnerabilities.  
 
We also look at how the current models used by criminals work, the requirements for these 
models, and even the pricing models charged for these kits for those not technically inclined 
enough to develop their own kit or exploits.  
5.2 History 
 
Danchev [60] does a thorough review of some of the first tools used to exploit vulnerabilities 
in browsers. The tools in the article are the first attempts of cybercriminals to exploit flaws in 
web browsers, and while they may seem rudimentary by today’s standards, the end object of 
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the exploits remain the same as they are today. 
 
In the following section we will show some of the tools used as analysed by Danchev, and 
how they were used to try to exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers. While this is by no 
means an exhaustive list of exploits used by criminals, it will show how exploits functioned 
over the last few years, and will show the reader how these tools and kits have evolved over 
time. 
 
5.2.1 The IE Exploiter 
 
The IE Exploiter tool first emerged in 2002 with the last version released in 2004 [61]. The 
tool allowed an exploiter to embed an executable file into HTML documents. When the code 
was viewed with an unpatched version of Internet Explorer 5, the file was automatically 
downloaded and executed. 
 
The second version of the exploiter also created an HTML file with an embedded executable, 
but once the HTML file was viewed, the executable file would overwrite the notepad.exe 
(part of Microsoft Windows) on the target system, and then execute it using the “view source: 
prefix.” 
 
5.2.2 Kings IE Exploiter 
 
The King’s IE Exploiter was an Arabic exploit embedding tool. It was first released in 2004. 
The software generated on-the-fly malware embedded sites but the sites were un-obfuscated. 
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Figure 14: King18 IE Exploiter screenshot [60] 
 
5.2.3 Zephyrus 
 
Danchev reports that Zephyrus was another tool released in 2004 (although Securelist 
reported it as early as 200217) and was designed to exploit vulnerability in Windows Media 
Player file attachments (Bugtraq ID: 55543). The pack creates a media file with the payload 
for the target server, and once an unpatched Windows Media Player executes the file, the 
exploit is launched. 
 
5.2.4 God’s Will 
 
The God’s Will exploit application uses an ActiveX bug in Internet Explorer 5.5, Microsoft 
Outlook and Outlook Express. When the victim opens the generated page, using an .HTA 
extension instead of the normal .HTML, the file is downloaded into the Microsoft Windows 
‘Startup’ folder, which allows it to be executed every time the machine starts via Microsoft 
HTML Application Host (mshta.exe). 
                                                        
17 http://www.securelist.com/en/descriptions/old53385 
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Figure 15: God’s Will exploit application screenshot [60] 
5.3 Functionality 
 
Due to the secretive nature of the underground criminal elements that run the different 
browser exploit packs, and the changing nature of the threat landscape, getting detailed 
academic research on the topic is difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some very good industry papers that study the nature of these browser 
exploit packs, and in this section we will look at some of these papers, white papers, and 
articles, and provide some detail about the workings of the exploit packs, the models the 
criminals use to sell the services, and the techniques the packs use to avoid detection. 
 
Due to the number of kits on the market, including the Fragus [62], Neospoilt Exploit Kit 
[63], Crimepack [64], Phoenix Exploit Kit [65], Red Dice [59], Bleeding Life [66], Sweet 
Orange [67] and Black Hole Exploit Kits [68], it would be near impossible for us to cover all 
the packs in the limited space of this thesis. So, we will look at the Sweet Orange and Black 
Hole Exploit Kits as examples of how they function. 
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5.3.1 Malware as a Service 
 
Danchev [67] reports on a web exploit kit called the Sweet Orange kit, with findings 
substantiated by Jones [69], that is being offered as Malware-as-a-service. In the article, 
Danchev reports that the malware is offered by Russian cyber criminals, operating just like a 
legitimate software development firm would, with pricing for the product (in this case the 
exploit kit) ranging from $375 for a week to $1400 for a month. Purchasing the software will 
set one back $2500. Additional services offered by the criminals include a $300 multi-domain 
licence, and $800 for support of the product.  
 
Danchev also reports that renting the product limits the traffic for the renter to 150kb/day, 
while purchasing the product allows for unlimited bandwidth use. Interestingly enough, 
Danchev also reports that the criminals that offer the service guarantee that the attached 
domains will remain clean for a long time, i.e. avoiding being blacklisted or listed on 
different malware domain lists. Lastly, Danchev reports that the vendor of the Sweet Orange 
kit offers 150 000 unique visitors to be redirected to the malicious payload server by the kit, 
either via Search Engine Poisoning or compromised content blog farms.  
 
Brook [68] reports that the Black Hole Exploit kit is responsible for 95% of all malicious 
URLs identified in the second half of 2011. According to Brook, the exploit kit offers 
vulnerability exploits including high profile bugs from Adobe, Java and Microsoft products, 
and offers a complete control panel with information ranging from the amount of infected 
machines per country to which of the exploits served has been the most successful, as shown 
in Figure 16.  
 
Kumar [70] from The Hacker News site reported that the cost of the Black Hole Exploit kit is 
as follows: annual licence $1500, semi-annual licence fee $1000, and a quarterly fee of $700. 
The fee includes free software updates for the duration of the licence. 
 
As with the Sweet Orange kit analysed earlier, this exploit kit is also offered as a service. 
Prospective customers who would prefer to rent the service instead of buying the licence can 
do so, with Hacker News reporting the pricing for the service as follows: $200 for one week, 
$300 for two weeks and $500 for a four week period. A registered domain name is included 
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in the service but should the customer wish to change it, there is an additional cost of $35. 
 
Figure 16: The Black Hole Exploit Kit control panel [71] 
 
Looking at these two exploit kits and their offerings, we can see that criminals run these kits 
just like legitimate businesses, but for a different set of customers. Should someone without 
the technical knowledge wish to engage in a Search Engine Poisoning campaign, all they 
would need to do is to contact one of the service providers and pay for the service, with 
limited technical skills needed. As can be seen in Figure 12, the kit offers simple interfaces 
that show the amount of infections per country using GeoIP locations (more on that in section 
5.3.4), the amount of infections per vulnerability, the amount of infections per operating 
system, and much more. 
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5.4 Back-End, Code and Obfuscation 
 
5.4.1 Analysis  
 
Sood and Enbody [59] do a thorough analysis of the Black Hole Exploit kit source code, 
including looking at what backend is required, how the software checks for the installed 
operating system on the victim machine, and how it checks for various exploits on the victim 
machine. 
 
The Black Hole Exploit kit runs on an LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySql, and PhP) server. 
Considering that 65.9% (at time of writing – December 2012) of all web servers on the 
internet run on Apache18, this makes for a wide base of possible installations for the kit. 
 
Sood and Enbody also report that the actual kit runs on an AJAX-based environment, in order 
to cater for a variety of widgets, and allows the different widgets to communicate with the 
target independently, as well as allowing for automatic updates of the widgets (part of the 
support package that is offered with the sale of the software, as discussed earlier). 
 
Sood and Enbody further show that the actual Black Hole Exploit kit backend code is written 
as PHP, HTML and Jar files. Obfuscation is done in two ways: Firstly, through a standard 
PHP encoder, and secondly, by using reverse encoding and concatenating for remote objects 
in VBScript. Sood and Enbody show that in order to analyse the code, several layers of 
decoding need to be done.  
 
Lastly, the Black Hole Exploit Kit uses a standard cryptographic function [59] and other 
cryptographic algorithms to make analysis of the code harder as it becomes difficult for 
analysts to read and analyse the code.  
 
5.4.2 Examples 
 
In Figure 17 is provided an example of a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code that the exploit 
kit will download to a victim’s system. The reason for the heavy obfuscation is to try to avoid 
                                                        
18 http://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ws-apache/all/all 
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detection by anti-virus software. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Obfuscated JavaScript code attempting to avoid detection by anti-virus 
software [72] 
 
Once the code is deobfuscated (see Figure 18), it becomes clear that the code targets CVE-
2009-167119, which is a multiple buffer overflow vulnerability in Java which can lead to code 
execution on the local machine. 
 
 
Figure 18: Decoded JavaScript code [72] 
 
Looking at the above decoded JavaScript, it will download a malicious binary from the server 
and execute it on the target system. 
 
5.4.3 Traffic Direction Script 
 
One of the features that distinguish the Black Hole Exploit Kit from the other kits on offer is 
the Traffic Direction Script. The concept has been included in other kits in some form, but the 
TDS script is an advanced engine that allows redirection of traffic through a set of rules as 
specified by the user of the kit.  
                                                        
19 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1671 
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The script allows the user or renter of a system to set up different landing pages for different 
criteria on their domain. These rules can be based on a wide variety of criteria; such as the 
operating system, the exploit the target system is vulnerable to, or the country of origin. An 
example would be to set a rule for users on Windows XP using Internet Explorer 7, while 
redirecting users using the Opera web browser on Apple’s iOS operating system to a different 
page, possibly serving a completely different exploit based on the previously discussed 
criteria. 
 
The TDS in the Black Hole Exploit Kit also allows the user to customise traffic flows for 
different rules, and provides a management interface for these flows. This allows the 
experienced user of the kit to maximise infection by customising pages and web page hits for 
a wide variety of operating systems and web browsers. 
 
5.5 Geo Location 
 
Geolocation according to King [73] works by automatically looking up a computer’s IP 
address on a server, usually a WHOIS server, and retrieving the physical address of the 
registrant associated with the server. This is useful for the operators of the Search Engine 
Poisoning campaigns as they can target their campaigns at specific audiences or locate where 
their victim is, and tailor the campaign to the location of the victim. 
 
5.5.1 Analysis 
 
Soon and Enbody [59] shows how the Black Hole Exploit Kit uses a GeoIP location system 
to keep track of infections on a per country basis, and Danchov shows us proof that the Sweet 
Orange exploit kit also uses a GeoIP system to keep track of infections per country. 
 
Soon and Enbody shows that the MaxMind20 free library is used by the Black Hole Exploit 
Kit as its GeoIP service, as is proved by Astacio [74] in his analysis of the Phoenix Exploit 
Kit, where the same MaxMind GeoIP service is used. This allows the operator of the 
                                                        
20 http://www.maxmind.com/app/ip-location 
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campaign using the exploit kits to see if their targeted audience is being reached, and in 
which country they are having the most success, all within the ease of a simple control panel. 
5.5.2 Examples 
 
In order to understand the significance of the GeoIP service and the use it serves the web 
exploit kits, we need to look at real life examples that have happened. This is where GeoIP 
information was actively used by the payload of the exploit kit in order to further the criminal 
activity of those running the Search Engine Poisoning campaign using the web exploit kits. 
 
In an article on abuse.ch [75], it shows a real-world example of how GeoIP is used by 
criminal elements. The article reports that the exploit is a drive-by exploit served via the 
Black Hole Exploit Kit, where users are lured onto the site via Search Engine Poisoning 
techniques.  
 
The exploit that is eventually executed on the target machine is part of a ransomware botnet. 
Once installed on the infected computer, the botnet contacts the command and control server, 
and depending on where the connection comes from, the location of the infected computer is 
calculated via GeoIP. The correct version of the ransomware is then launched, specific to the 
country it is aimed at, as shown with a Polish example in Figure 19.  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Screenshot of the ransomware [76] 
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The article shows various different versions of the ransomware software, customised for 
countries including Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter was not meant to be an exhaustive list of web exploit kits through the last few 
years. It is intended purely for the reader to see the evolution of the exploit kits. From the 
very first kits appearing on the internet over ten years ago to today’s incredibly complex web 
exploit kits, we can see that a complete evolution has happened in the criminal underground 
in order to compromise computer systems, all via web exploits. 
 
The purposes of the exploit kits have evolved, and in doing so become multi-purpose, able to 
deliver various payloads to various platforms via various means. The exploit kits determine 
the operating system and the weakness in the system, and then exploit them. No longer is it 
simply a case of having one exploit and hoping for a system to visit the site that is vulnerable 
to the particular exploit. 
 
From what we have seen in this chapter, the complete cycle for the cybercriminal is in place. 
Web exploit kits can be rented, and payloads customised; and Search Engine Poisoning 
campaigns guaranteeing certain amounts of hits all come bundled as software-as-a-service 
models for those with the necessary capital and the inclination to commit online crime. 
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6.Manual Search Engine Poisoning 
Research 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Part of this study into Search Engine Poisoning looks into manual search engine poisoning 
research, and the results that can be obtained when users search the internet in a normal way, 
i.e. not specifically looking for SEP campaigns, but looking at popular topics on the internet. 
Zhang et al [77] note that compromised websites used for Search Engine Poisoning behave 
differently depending on the requests they receive, and thus return a different result to a web 
crawler than to a normal user.  
 
Note that during the research for this chapter, no automated data collection took place. The 
research focuses on the very results that compromised sites deliver to the user when they visit 
a site as mentioned by Zhang et al. Automated searching for SEP campaigns will be 
discussed in chapter 7 in great detail, while in this chapter the results are all manually 
collected, with starting points being popular search terms, part of which is gathered from 
previous research, such as the MacAfee Dangerous Celebrity list [31]. 
 
This chapter will focus on results found when looking for some popular and news-focused 
terms on the internet. The goal of this chapter is to see the effectiveness of search engines in 
blocking SEP campaigns, and to look at what campaigns are still active despite the measures 
that search engines put in place to block the operators of these campaigns, as well as to see 
what type of campaigns these are, and what (if any) malware is deposited on the victims’ 
personal computers when landing on a page that is part of an SEP campaign. 
 
A final objective of this chapter is to establish how effective search engines are at filtering 
out search engine poisoned links during high profile events, especially since this year features 
both the Euro 2012 Soccer Championship and the 2012 Summer Olympic Games. This will 
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be done manually as a person is able to interact more with the search engine and fine tune the 
search queries depending on the results, than an automated script or honey client. 
 
6.1.1 System Configuration 
 
The test system for the manual research was a normal desktop computer with 18GB ram, to 
accommodate the memory requirements that VMware Workstation had during the testing 
done on multiple virtual machines. The software configuration consisted of a fully patched 
Windows 7 client, using VMWare Workstation with the following virtual machines for 
testing: 
 
A. Windows XP with Service Pack 2 & Internet Explorer 6 
B. Windows XP with Service Pack 2 & Internet Explorer 8 
C. Windows XP with Service Pack 3 & Internet Explorer 8 
D. Windows XP with Service Pack 2 & Avast Antivirus 
E. Ubuntu Linux 64bit Workstation 11.4 
 
The reason for choosing Avast Antivirus was based on the fact that at the time of writing, 
Avast was the most popular download on CNET21: With over a million downloads on one 
location, it proved to be the most popular free anti-virus product. The antivirus product was 
updated every time before testing to ensure that the latest patch level and version was used. 
At the time of writing Avast Antivirus was on Program Version 7.0.1474, with the Virus 
Definition on version 121207-1, containing 4 172 774 definitions. Due to licencing issues, we 
were unable to use Windows 7 within a virtual environment to do additional testing. Keizer 
[78] reported in October 2012, that 41% of the world’s computers still run Windows XP, and 
allows for vulnerable applications such as Adobe Reader and Java to run on it as a platform. 
Given this data by Keizer, it was felt that the exclusion of Windows 7 due to the licencing 
issue would not skew the results. The Ubuntu Linux Workstation 11.4 was used for additional 
data and malware analysis, including packet capturing and analysis. Using various virtual 
machines allowed us to look at the effect of possible malware sites on different 
configurations. A simplified overview of the testing environment is provided in Figure 20 
  
                                                        
21 http://download.cnet.com/windows/ 
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Figure 20: Testing Environment / Process 
 
6.1.2 User or Search Engine 
 
Howard and Komili [19] mentioned the importance of SEO attacks being able to distinguish 
between the origins of a visitor, for the campaign being launched by the operator. According 
to Howard and Komili, it is important for the operator, as they need to know what type of 
page to generate. Should it be a web crawler, it will return the relevant keyword optimised 
content, while if it is a human visitor stumbling upon the page or being directed by a search 
engine, the content needs to be different.  
 
This content, as we will see in the following sections, can be anything from a botnet client, a 
fake anti-virus program or just a malicious program or toolbar. 
50 
 
6.2 Campaigns Found 
 
During our searches on the internet using both the Google and Bing search engines, several 
different Search Engine Poisoning campaigns were found. In the next section an in-depth 
analysis of these findings are done. 
 
Initial searches were done on a fully patched Windows 7 computer using the Google Chrome 
browser with McAfee’s Site Advisor22 software plugin installed, running the Avast 
Professional Licence anti-virus software with up to date signatures. 
 
Once a link was identified to be potentially the result of an SEP campaign, it was studied 
using two different virtual machines: One running Windows XP with Internet Explorer 6 
(configuration A), and the other running Windows XP with Internet Explorer 8 (configuration 
B). The virtual machines were unpatched apart from the described service pack level and 
running no anti-virus, allowing for the best chance of infection or malicious triggers to 
happen. The reason for running two different versions of Internet Explorer was to 
accommodate sites that were part of an SEP campaign but aimed at a later version of the 
Internet Explorer browser. 
 
Should any malware be downloaded visibly to the host, the malware is analysed with the help 
of the VirusTotal website23 which gives an indication of how many of the participating anti-
virus products identify the possible malware program. At the time of writing (December 
2012), VirusTotal had a total of 41 participating anti-virus products.   
 
6.3 Tumblr 
 
The first identified example of Search Engine Poisoning that was found via manual searching 
involved the microblogging service called Tumblr, wherein fake pages were created within 
Tumblr, populated with popular search terms, and then used to try to further exploit visitors. 
As a microblogging platform, Tumblr allows a user to post a small entry on a custom page in 
various ways, from normal text, to photos, audio and even video. In the following section we 
                                                        
22
 http://www.siteadvisor.com/ 
23 https://www.virustotal.com/ 
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will analyse and discuss the findings in-depth, as well as show examples of the campaign 
through pictures and screenshots. 
 
6.3.1 Search Results 
 
 
Starting with McAfee’s list of most dangerous celebrities (mentioned in section 3.3)24, each 
celebrity’s name was entered into Google, and the results studied on the 19th June 2012. Four 
of the celebrities’ names resulted in a Search Engine Poisoning campaign that originated 
from the Tumblr. 
 
The names of Jessica Biel, Katherine Heigl, Adriana Lima and Mila Kunis were all used to 
trick people into clicking on the link. See screenshots for some of the different URLs 
generated by the campaign in Figure 21. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Examples of the Tumblr Search Engine Poisoning campaign 
 
Using the McAfee list of dangerous celebrities, a simple search resulted in 40% of the list of 
names being used in one SEP campaign. One interesting observation noted is that on the 
                                                        
24 http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2011/q3/20110915-02.aspx 
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machine used for the initial searching, an aftermarket product by McAfee called McAfee Site 
Advisor was run to help find potential malicious sites, as stated in 6.2. As can be seen in 
Figure 16, all four of the URLs were flagged as unknown by the software used. This means 
that McAfee as a security software provider did not have any information on the sites, and 
was thus unable to warn users that they might contain malicious content. This shows why 
Search Engine Poisoning campaign operators prefer to run off the infrastructure of reputable 
websites (as per Tumblr in this example), as it makes it easier to appear as legitimate sites to 
the uneducated visitor, or at least appear as an unknown, rather than a site flagged as 
dangerous.   
 
6.3.2 The Page 
 
Once a user clicked on one of the compromised links, the user is presented with an authentic 
looking web page running off the Tumblr domain name. The page then offers the visitor a 
chance to see one of the celebrities in a video, and presents an authentic looking media player 
interface. Figure 22 has an example of one of the pages as a visual reference, allowing the 
reader to see exactly how the landing page looks. The media player interface is a normal 
picture created to resemble the functionality of media player, but without any actual 
functionality attached. 
 
While the heading of the page is legible and crafted to gather the interest of the visitor, the 
rest of the writing on the page looks to have been done via a random generator with only the 
key words highlighted. 
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Figure 22: The page on Tumblr generated by the Search Engine Poisoning campaign. 
 
Once the visitor clicks on the ‘media player’, a message is displayed that the user needs to 
upgrade their version of Adobe Flash Player, and offers a download of an executable aptly 
named ‘install_flashplayer.exe’. 
 
6.3.3 Malware Analysis 
 
The executable file was downloaded and saved on the desktop for analysis. Once saved, the 
file was uploaded to VirusTotal for analysis on the 19th of June 2012, with the following 
results: 
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SHA256: 837d13abaa49c043020f7012202a976572867cc95dce780f3a7e93d37a9be5b1 
File name: install_flashplayer.exe 
Detection ratio: 16 / 41 
Analysis date: 2012-06-19 18:38:33 UTC 
 
Figure 23: VirusTotal Analysis screenshot 
 
Sixteen of the Anti-Virus engines identified the file as being malware as seen in Figure 23. 
The file was identified to be part of the ‘Zero Access’ Trojan. McAfee Labs does a detailed 
analysis of the Zero Access Trojan [79], showing the behaviour and various guises that the 
Trojan takes, and during our analysis we see that much of this behaviour is the same.  What is 
of concern is that several of the biggest anti-virus vendors on the market do not identify this 
file as malicious. On our Avast Antivirus test system it did not find this file as malicious at 
the time of writing. 
 
Once the data capture of the connections the malware makes once it runs is studied, the data 
can be compared with the data on the McAfee report. This is done purely for completeness’ 
sake, as this thesis does not concentrate on malware analysis; but it is felt that a comparison 
of the behaviour of the malware found in the research here with already documented research 
is important. 
 
Figure 24: The Wireshark PCAP of the malware communicating 
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The malware connects out to a series of IP addresses on various ports, and one of the 
interesting items noted in the following screenshot is the malware trying to do a Geo lookup 
to determine where the infected host is located as shown in Figure 24. This is behaviour that 
is consistent with the findings as shown in 5.5. As discussed in Section 5.5 it shows where 
GeoIP services are used to look up where a victim’s computer may be and then it generates 
content specific to a target audience in a certain country. Figure 19 represents a screenshot of 
one of the packets captured during the testing of the malware sample that was downloaded, 
and the behaviour found is in line with the behaviour described by McAfee, and the figure 
represents the exact packet that does the GeoIP lookup to determine where the test machine 
(virtual machine in this case) is located. 
  
A more detailed analysis of the malware can be found on the McAfee site listed earlier where 
the ZeroAccess Trojan is completely analysed (not the aim of this thesis, as mentioned 
before). 
 
6.3.4 Redirects  
 
Once the visitor has clicked on the fake media player on the page, the visitor is also 
redirected through two other URLs. The first site the user is redirected to is: 
http://soqqa.otvety.in/mylink.php To determine where this site is located we do a name 
service lookup for this site. 
 
--> nslookup soqqa.otvety.in 
Server:         72.14.179.5 
Address:        72.14.179.5#53 
 
Non-authoritative answer: 
Name:   soqqa.otvety.in 
Address: 95.211.109.73 
 
The visitor is then redirected to a second URL: http://soqqa.vsetut.in/goto.html? 
 
--> nslookup soqqa.vsetut.in 
Server:         72.14.179.5 
Address:        72.14.179.5#53 
 
Non-authoritative answer: 
Name:   soqqa.vsetut.in 
Address: 95.211.109.73 
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Using the MaxMind25 GeoIP service to track the location of the IP address, we established 
that both the URLs are seen to be hosted on the same server; a server hosting service in the 
Netherlands called LeaseWeb in the city of Amsterdam, which is not one of the so called 
‘bulletproof hosting’ providers as described by Krebs [80]. 
 
When doing a domain registration search for the two domains, two different sets of 
credentials are provided, both with user names that have free web-based email addresses 
associated with them (e.g. gmail.com, Google’s free email service). The only similarity in the 
domain information is the country of registration, being ‘UZ’ (Uzbekistan), and the country 
code used with the telephone number provided. Both the telephone numbers differed though. 
 
From this URL, the visitor is then redirected to a landing page. In the research done the 
destination landing page differed completely depending on which of the Tumblr URLs were 
followed. The different sites were as follows: 
 
1) http://tour.mrskin.com/pg?nats=NTMzMTg6Mzox%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0 
2) http://tour.mrskin.com/n/big-boob-celebs?nats=NTMzMTQ6Mzox,0,0,0,0 
3) http://www.celebrities-on-net.com/old-
tour/?nats=MTAwMDAzMi41LjEuMTQuMjIuMC4wLjAuMA 
4) http://celebrityspanker.com/t1/?nats=NDg0OjQ6MTU,0,0,0,0 
5) http://homemadecelebrityporn.com/t1/?nats=NDg0OjQ6MTM,0,0,0,0 
6) http://dirtyteencelebrities.com/t1/?nats=NDg0OjQ6MTY,0,0,0,0 
 
When trying to find information on the owners of any of these URLs, in the hope of trying to 
establish a link between the originating URLs, the redirect URLs and the destination URLs, it 
was found that all the pornographic site URLs were all registered through the company 
Moniker26. Moniker allows for privacy services when registering domains, thus hiding the 
true identity of the owner from normal domain ‘whois’ queries. Without being able to 
identify the owners of the sites, it is difficult to try and establish a link between those who are 
running the Search Engine Poisoning campaign and those who paid to have their sites 
promoted. 
 
 
                                                        
25
 http://www.maxmind.com/ 
26 https://www.moniker.com/ 
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6.3.5 Summary 
 
Looking through this Search Engine Poisoning campaign, the classic tactics and execution of 
an SEP campaign are used as described by John et al, Howard and Komili, and Bott in 
section 2.4.  
 
Firstly, pages are used in a trusted service, in this case Tumblr. The pages are populated with 
key words; in this case the names of the celebrities, to attract visitors. Once the visitor lands 
on the site, there is an attempt to install malware. This is done either covertly using an 
exploit, or claiming to be another product as in this particular case. The visitor is then 
redirected through several sites, finally landing on the destination page. 
 
In this particular campaign we see there is a twofold objective: The installation of malware 
on the victim’s computer, and redirecting to pornographic sites, possibly to gain subscribers 
to the service, or for advertisement revenue. Being unable to establish any link between the 
initial redirect sites and the end-destination, we can only assume that the redirects were the 
result of a paid-for advertising campaign by the site operators of the destination pornographic 
websites. 
6.4 Fake Anti-Virus 
 
In section 2.4 we looked at the paper by Rajab et al. concerning the spread of fake anti-virus 
software through Search Engine Poisoning. This study was done in 2009, and presented the 
perfect opportunity for this thesis to see if the scenario has changed. 
 
During 2010 and 2011, Microsoft, along with a law enforcement agency, succeeded in taking 
down the Waledac [81], Rustock [82] and Kelihos [83] botnets. While these are by no means 
the only botnets in existence, these were responsible for large amounts of spam and fake anti-
virus software distribution [84]. 
 
In light of this, we wanted to see if the fake anti-virus industry was still a threat to the average 
internet user. 
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6.4.1 Search Result 
 
The result was found during the author’s day to day duties as an information security 
consultant on contract at a large financial institution in 16 July 2012. Upon discovery, it 
looked like a possible fake anti-virus website. It was decided to look at the current operation 
of fake anti-virus software in an attempt to provide a full picture of the pitfalls that internet 
users are exposed to. 
 
The link was to a compromised WordPress installation with the following URL: 
http://www.enaruto.pl/wp-content/plugins/zoucojfoege/love.php?direction210.gif 
 
The link appeared to be hidden in what seems to be the plugin directory for a WordPress blog 
software installation. It is unclear without having direct access to the installation if this is a 
compromised plugin installed by the website owner, or a compromise of the website by the 
operators of fake anti-virus software operation who are hiding the compromise under the 
plugin directory in order to look authentic. The latter is however the most likely given the 
history of WordPress and the vulnerabilities within it. 
 
What is known is that there have been instances where WordPress plugins have been 
compromised allowing hackers to submit malicious code via the code repository. Dede [85] 
does a good investigation of one of these attacks, showing how malicious code could be 
executed by just visiting a compromised website with one of these plugins installed. Should 
the owner of this particular site have installed or updated a plugin which was not properly 
checked, it could easily have allowed an attack to leverage the compromised install. 
 
Smola [86] also does a similar exercise in researching common vulnerabilities within 
WordPress and actively identifies 14 different plugins in the WordPress stable that had 
vulnerabilities at the time of writing the article. Once the vulnerabilities were identified, each 
of the plugin owners were notified and the vulnerability fixed, or the plugin was pulled from 
the WordPress repository. Both Dede and Smola however shows how easy it is to 
compromise or exploit a WordPress plugin. 
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6.4.2 Fake Antivirus Warning 
 
While visiting the front page of the website, no evidence of compromise is evident in the 
visited website, as found by the research in this thesis. Browsing the infected section of the 
page will throw up a warning that the user’s machine is possibly infected with a virus and it 
needs to be scanned for viruses as shown in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25: The Fake Anti-Virus message displayed on the website 
 
Once the user clicks on the ‘OK’ button, the user is redirected to several different websites 
(discussed in section 6.2.2.4), showing what ultimately looks like a legitimate anti-virus scan 
of the user’s computer (or would appear legitimate to the unwise internet user). 
 
6.4.3 Fake Anti-Virus Executable 
 
The executable file was downloaded and saved on the desktop for analysis. Once saved the 
file was uploaded to VirusTotal for analysis on the 16th of July 2012, with the following 
results: 
 
SHA256: a8bf413c6c4a9fab682849b78dbf3f315080bcc89632640e94b804efc31c4b74 
File name: setup.exe 
Detection ratio: 21 / 42 
Analysis date: 2012-07-16 15:51:31 UTC 
 
Figure 26: VirusTotal Analysis screenshot 
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Twenty-one of the Anti-Virus engines identified the file as being a fake anti-virus trojan as 
per Figure 26. The file was identified to be part of the Win32FakeAV Trojan. Once the 
application was run on a disposable virtual machine using Microsoft Windows XP Service 
Pack 2 and Internet Explorer 8 (configuration B), the application executes and runs what 
looks like a legitimate anti-virus scan on the host computer. The version analysed was called 
‘Windows Web Combat’. Unfortunately there is no way to tell who wrote the application or 
its origins, but Kaspersky Labs [87] does provide some useful information and analysis, 
something which is not the objective of this thesis. 
 
The application prompts the user to click on the interface to clear all the viruses, at which 
point the user needs to purchase a legitimate version of the software, part of the extortion 
campaign used by the fake anti-virus software vendors. An interesting note with regards to 
the picture presented in Figure 27 is how the authors of fake anti-virus program use the 
Microsoft genuine software branding to try getting you to activate the program. 
 
 
 
Figure 27: The Fake Anti-Virus screen prompting users to buy a ‘full’ version of the 
software 
 
Once rebooted, the application starts itself again, prompting the user to scan for viruses and 
repeats the process. Without proper anti-virus or anti-malware software, it proved difficult to 
remove the software from the virtual host machine we used for testing. The only way to 
remove it was to roll back the virtual machine via features provided as part of VMWare 
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Workstation. 
 
Since this was just an overview of the trojan application,  focusing on how it is spread rather 
than the payload itself, we didn’t research it in any further detail. Full details of the 
Win32FakeAV Trojan, including files dropped and registry changes done to host computers 
can be found on the Kaspersky Labs [87] website. 
 
6.4.4 Redirects 
 
As soon as the user clicked on the ‘OK’ button on the initial landing page, the browser was 
redirected to two different URLs. These were: 
http://wreckverifylow.info/277c9/f91c93e55e5ba6b1/pr2/210/ 
http://avcomputerprotection.info/ig6ap1we/f91c93e55e5ba6b1/js2/0/ 
 
Due to the nature of the .info TLD it was very difficult to gather any information on the 
domains. Doing a domain lookup on the domains did not yield much information, and all the 
domain info was protected by privacyprotect.org. 
 
To quote the privacyprotect.org [88] website, “Privacy Protection is a WHOIS privacy 
service for domain name owners that we provide through our partners”. This allows the user 
relative anonymity and would probably require some sort of law enforcement documentation 
in order to obtain the details of the true owner of these domains. 
 
6.4.5 Summary 
 
Three years after the study done by Rajab et al., and with the takedown of three of the botnets 
that were responsible for spreading fake anti-virus software, we have seen in this section that 
the fake anti-virus industry is still very much alive and looking for various ways to infect 
computers and extort money from the average internet user. Looking at the history associated 
with the particular sample found during our search, this particular strain of fake anti-virus 
software has been operating since 2008. 
 
While the methods of infecting and redirecting a user’s PC have changed slightly, including 
infiltrating the plugin repositories of popular blogging platforms, as discussed in 6.2.2.1, the 
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basic premise is still the same: Find a way for the user to visit the website, infect the user’s 
PC or convince the user to install an application they should not trust, and then extort money 
from unsuspecting users. 
 
6.5 2012 Summer Olympic Games 
 
The 2012 Summer Olympic Games took place from the 27th July 2012 to 12 August 2012. 
With 10 500 athletes from 204 countries competing for 4700 medals, this event was bound to 
attract the interest of those bent on infiltrating the search results of those looking for results 
and information on the Games. 
 
Various security and anti-virus companies warned about the search for information regarding 
the 2012 Olympic Games, including Haywood [89] and Waters [90], and thus it was of great 
relevance to this thesis to see if, via normal search methods (non-automated), any form of 
Search Engine Poisoning could be found. 
 
As stated in our introduction to this section, part of the research was to see how successful 
search engines are at stopping poisoned links during high profile sporting events, and how 
easy it is for the average sports fan to fall foul to a poisoned page. 
 
6.5.1 Search Results 
 
With some of the previous results coming from Google’s search engine, we decided that it 
would be interesting to see if any of the other search engines were also susceptible to 
poisoning during the 2012 Olympic Games. 
 
A quick search or two on Yahoo! provided us with the first proper hit. The search term “2012 
olympics beach volley ball” provided us with an interesting link as seen in Figure 28 below. 
Figure 28: The Yahoo! search result 
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6.5.2 The Page 
 
Once the page opens it provides the user with the possibility of a video of female beach 
volleyball players, but when the user clicks on the link it fails to display the video. It states 
the video is no longer available due to the account being suspended on YouTube as per 
Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29: The fake landing page 
 
Instead the page opens a page offering the download of a screensaver as seen in Figure 30. 
 
 
 
Figure 30: The advertisement for the screensaver 
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6.5.3 Redirects 
 
The original URL (landing page) was http://www.nowpublic.com/sports/hot-and-sexy-
olympic-beach-volleyball-girls which popped up the advertisement on http://c5.zedo.com 
Once the user clicks on the link, the page redirects to the link: 
http://free.marineaquariumfree.com/index.jhtml?spu=true&partner=0Dxdm085 and the user 
is invited to click on the link and download the free screensaver. An interesting note is that 
the screensaver has nothing to do with the original search result. 
To determine where the first site is located we do a name service lookup for this site. 
 
--> nslookup www.nowpublic.com 
Server:         172.1.0.6 
Address:        172.1.0.6#53 
 
Non-authoritative answer: 
Name:   www.nowpublic.com.cdngc.net 
Address: 93.188.128.19 
 
Using the MaxMind27 GeoIP service to track the location of the IP address we determine that 
the first site is located in the United States, in the city of Panther in the state of Iowa. 
To determine where the second site is located we do a name service lookup for this site. 
 
--> nslookup free.marineaquariumfree.com 
Server:         172.1.0.6 
Address:        172.1.0.6#53 
 
Non-authoritative answer: 
Name:   www180.miway.com 
Address: 74.113.233.180 
 
Using MaxMind again, we track the server serving the ad-ware to a host in White Plains in 
New York in the United States. It was interesting to see that those responsible for this simple 
adware program had done little to protect their WHOIS information, in contrast to the 
examples shown earlier. 
 
                                                        
27 http://www.maxmind.com/ 
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6.5.4 Malware Analysis 
 
The executable file was downloaded and saved on the desktop for analysis. Once saved the 
file was uploaded to VirusTotal for analysis on the 13th of August 2012, with the results 
shown in Figure 31: 
 
Figure 31: VirusTotal Analysis screenshot 
 
Sixteen of the forty-two engines picked the file up as potential malware, but interestingly 
enough it was identified as only an ad-ware installer and not a virus. Nevertheless, the fact 
that these engines all have it listed is reason for further investigation. Suspect behaviour 
might include the installation of a search toolbar that is not the default (i.e. Google), and 
displaying advertisements or redirecting search results. 
 
Looking at some of the dangers described by Gutzman et al. [91], this danger is still prevalent 
nine years later, tricking the unsuspecting internet user into downloading and installing these 
types of applications. 
 
6.5.5 Conclusion 
 
The most interesting part of this example has been seeing how one of the oldest techniques 
for luring users to download a malicious file is still being employed by those operating 
Search Engine Poisoning techniques today, nine years after Gutzman et al. [91], and six years 
after Wang et al [16] first documented it.  
 
The method is simple: Poison search results with popular search terms, lure users to the site, 
pop up an advertisement screen, entice the user to click on the screen, and offer something 
like a pretty screensaver, and the circle is complete. 
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Once the user downloads the file and executes it, the malware author has near unlimited 
access to the infected PC and associated resources. This includes not just listening in on the 
browser cache file (and so analysing and serving up the right advertisements at the right 
time), but also continuously being able to spy on the user, and their browsing and shopping 
habits, and thus adjusting the advertising campaigns. 
6.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter the research set out to see if it could emulate the average user on the internet, 
and without any real protection on our test systems, see if we could fall foul of a Search 
Engine Poisoning campaign. A small overview of the research platform and virtual 
environment is provided, in order to help the reader understand the methodology used.  
 
Our searches focused on a few simple search terms, including popular celebrities, and also 
the 2012 Summer Olympics. Part of the research here was to see if the statistics that vendors 
publish about the prevalence of Search Engine Poisoning are indeed true, or if it is a tactic to 
try and sell more products to protect the average user against web exploits.  
 
The search results were a success, and three very different campaigns were found. The first 
campaign had compromised a popular micro-blogging service and faked a popular browser 
plugin in order to try to gain access to the victim’s computer. Another search yielded a fake 
anti-virus exploit kit, trying to extort the user in to buying a fake anti-virus program. The 
third search result to successfully try and exploit the victim’s computer was found when 
searching for information regarding the 2012 Summer Olympic Games. This was the least 
dangerous piece of malware discovered during our manual searching process, but it was 
malware nonetheless. It was felt that choosing to find more than the three different campaigns 
discussed in this chapter would not have added to the value that this chapter adds to the 
thesis, and would have unnecessarily lengthened the thesis to prove exactly the conclusions 
that were found here. 
 
Through these tests we were able to demonstrate that Search Engine Poisoning campaigns are 
still alive and well, and each one of the different campaigns we found had some sort of 
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malware program that it attempted to drop on the victim’s computer. Even with the attempts 
by the search engines to combat Search Engine Poisoning, the campaigns are still being 
launched and are very easy for the average user to fall victim to, as we were able to prove. 
 
During this chapter no automated tools or methods were used, as the research set out to 
emulate the average user on the internet and their actions while searching for various news 
and high profile events including celebrity deaths and even high profile sports events. In the 
next chapter the study methodology turns to automated searching, where data is collected in 
an automated fashion and parsed through various tools in order to see if Search Engine 
Poisoning is prevalent in top trends in Google on a daily basis. 
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7.Automated Research 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
Eric E. Schmidt28 (former CEO of Google) wrote “The Internet is the first thing that 
humanity has built that humanity doesn't understand, the largest experiment in anarchy that 
we have ever had.” Unfortunately his words ring very true today, as this thesis has done 
research into what criminal elements will do in order to use the internet, specifically the 
search engines, for their own gain, by poisoning results returned by those very search 
engines. 
 
In this chapter we describe the automated process we used to gather top trends on Google’s 
search engine from 1 February 2012 to 3 September 2012; we do the data analysis of the data 
gathered; and we look at trends and anomalies that might have occurred during the time 
period, in order to better understand how successful Search Engine Poisoning is today. 
7.2 Processing the information 
 
7.2.1 System Configuration 
 
For the automated research a virtual host was commissioned from a commercial vendor 
hosted outside South Africa. This was done purely as a commercial decision as the host was 
the most affordable that could be found in the quick search that was done for a provider. The 
virtual host ran on an Ubuntu Linux Server 11.10, with data logged to a MySql version 5.5.24 
Database via simple Python scripts, and administrated through a PhpMyadmin version 3.4.10 
interface, running on an Apache 2.2.22 web server. 
 
The motivation for a data server outside of South Africa was driven by the need for a stable 
                                                        
28 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Schmidt 
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but high speed internet connection, clean power, low possibility of outages and cost factors. 
While the capacity of the server was not a concern, the ability to send URLs and receive 
results at speed was, and a hired external server was deemed the most cost effective solution 
for the short duration of the research data gathering. 
 
7.2.2 Data gathering  
 
During the research period, as described in section 7.1, data was gathered on a daily basis 
through a script running once every twenty-four hours. This consisted of scrubbing the top 
ten trends on the Google research engine, and then gathering the related URLs for each trend. 
As covered by Moore [35] earlier, we hope to see if the changes Google has made to their 
ranking algorithm over the last year have done anything to stop the Search Engine Poisoning 
operators from being able to get results into the Google Top trends. 
 
The decision to run the script only once every day was made for several reasons. During 
initial testing, running the script several times a day caused a large number of duplicate URLs 
which caused overhead in our processing system, as these would have to be removed, and 
would possibly not have given us a clear view of the amount of unique trends for a day.  
 
While it was certainly possible to retrieve data up to once every hour, the feeling was that this 
would have caused more ‘noise’ in the data analysis than accurate data, and as such, the 
decision was made to run the script once a day. 
 
Before the data was passed on to the automated tools, it was sanitised to allow us to look for 
and strip out duplicates or malformed URLs which the tools would be unable to process, for 
example, http://0.0.0.0 (a result we saw several times during the research period). These 
occurred for several reasons, including Google’s own redirecting mechanism for pages, as 
well as dead links from URL shortening services such ‘bit.ly’29. One possibility that was 
considered could be the use of the URL shortening services by the campaign operators as 
another method to disguise their campaigns. Due to the short life span of these URL’s it was 
impossible to determine this possibility, though looking at some of the studies done by 
Danchev [67], Sood and Enbody [59] and Kumar [70], this is not normal behaviour in the 
                                                        
29 https://bitly.com/ 
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exploit kits and services offered.  
 
7.2.3 Data processing 
 
The next step consisted of taking each of the URLs and running it through an automated set 
of scripts which fed the URLs to various tools as described in section 3.4. These tools would 
then tell us if the URL had any suspicious information on it, or if it was a safe and clean site.  
 
These automated runs took place once a week as it was decided that for some of the tools to 
be effective in detecting the malicious elements of a site, time needed to pass. One of the 
tools is fed information from other sources and as such, scanning once a week allowed the 
tool to be more effective in helping us detect malicious sites. 
 
The results for the various URLs (i.e. seeing if they contain any malicious content) were then 
retrieved from the various tools, and all results fed into the MySQL database via various 
Python scripts. The beauty of some of the tools was that they even provided example scripts 
to interface with their API via Python, allowing for data to be submitted and retrieved much 
more easily. 
 
7.2.4 Data statistics 
 
During the 31 weeks from 1 February 2012 to 31 August 2012 that the automated data 
gathering ran, the total amount of non-sanitised URLs collected amounted to 44 874 URLs, 
with an average of 207 unique URLs per day, and 1447 URLs per week. 
 
Figure 32 shows the amount of URLs collected every day for the research period, with small 
increases or decreases, depending on how well a news item or trend was picked up by high 
ranking websites or news sites on the internet. 
 
Figure 33 shows the number of URLs collected every week for the same period, but allows us 
to show in greater detail the rise and fall of the top trends and associated sites. Two spikes in 
the graph show the detail of the definite increase in URLs associated with top trends, and we 
will be looking at that more closely later on in this chapter. 
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Figure 32: Daily URLs collected – February to August 2012 
 
 
Figure 33: Weekly URLs collected – February to August 2012 
 
7.3 Automated Data Findings 
 
By interfacing with the VirusTotal API, as described in 3.4.2 and 7.2.3, it allowed us to 
classify certain URLs as either malicious or malware sites. With VirusTotal interfacing with 
over thirty (30) different anti-virus vendors, it gives us a good starting point for identifying 
websites infected with and/or used in Search Engine Poisoning campaigns. 
 
All the collected URLs are alternatively sent to JSunpack (see 3.4.1) and Thug (3.4.3) for 
analysis, to identify possible malicious content. All this data is then compared and analysed 
to give us a fairly comprehensive picture of whether a URL is indeed suspect or not. 
 
During our analysis, there were some false positives and errors, and we will look at some of 
those in section 7.3.1, and try to find an explanation for those false positives. 
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Once all URLs were sanitised and faulty URLs removed (as shown in section 7.2.2), the total 
results came to a staggering 698 943 results. The majority of these were as a result of the 
VirusTotal API allowing us to test a URL and retrieve multiple results from multiple sources 
for a single URL. During the course of our research, the resources that VirusTotal queried for 
results also increased, from an initial 31 to 34 sources as VirusTotal incorporated the back 
end databases of new tools as they were released and allowed for interfacing with their back 
end through an open API. This is as new research and new products are released and allow 
for the results to be interfaced with VirusTotal. 
 
7.3.1 False Positives 
 
When looking at the data on a weekly basis we did find that there were one or two incidents 
where there was a false positive in the data. A false positive as described by Redja [92] is 
“false detection or false alarm, occurs when an antivirus program detects a known virus string 
in an uninfected file”.  
 
In the case of our research we found that some of the engines would trigger on a word 
contained in a URL or on the website(s) and mark it as a malicious site. During our weekly 
investigations into the results of the week’s processing of the data, the offending URLs were 
then visited to see if there was really malicious content on the website. 
 
7.3.1.1 www.askmen.com 
 
One of the first false positives to be identified was the site www.askmen.com. During our 
research from February to September 2012 this site appeared no less than sixty-seven (67) 
times and was always flagged as malicious by the Yandex30 search engine. Yandex as 
described by its profile is one of the leading search engines and internet companies in Russia. 
During the research period, each of the false positives from the www.askmen.com site was 
investigated and nothing malicious found. The site had such a high appearance on our Google 
Trends as it contains up-to-date information on most celebrity topics which make news. By 
its own definition31, www.askmen.com is “A leading online media and services company 
                                                        
30
 http://company.yandex.com/ 
31 http://corp.ign.com/about/ 
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obsessed with gaming, entertainment and everything guys enjoy”. During the research period, 
www.askmen.com featured every time a celebrity made the Google Trends top 10 list, e.g. 
Christian Bale during the launch of the Batman movie ‘The Dark Knight Rises’, and the 
associated Aurora shootings32. Yandex search reported the site as containing the JS/Sinowal-
V Trojan, being a cross-site scripting exploit. More information on cross-site scripting 
exploits can be found in the excellent paper by Bojinov et al [93] ‘XCS: cross channel 
scripting and its impact on web applications’. During our investigations no evidence of this 
was found, even when using an out-dated and unpatched Microsoft Windows XP virtual 
machines (configuration A, B, C and D). During discussions with other information security 
practitioners the only plausible conclusion we could come to was that the site was infected at 
some stage in the last twelve to twenty-four months, and some of the engines still flag it as 
suspicious as they have not updated their records. 
 
7.3.1.2 DNS Changer 
 
During the week of the 9th to the 15th of July, the DNS changer malware made the headlines 
as the possibility existed of thousands of computers being disconnected from the internet. 
Baltazar et al [94] explain how the DNS changer malware infected thousands of unsuspecting 
computers as part of the Koobface botnet. The botnet consisted of various components, one 
of which was a DNS (Domain Name Server) filter / changing program that would redirect an 
infected computer to a malicious site, and prevent it from being able to connect to a site able 
to remove the software, such as an anti-virus software site. 
 
The reason why the DNS changer malware made headlines (and thus appeared on our lists) is 
that on the 9th of July 2012 the FBI in the United States of America shut down two fake DNS 
servers operated by the Koobface gang33. 
 
Seven URLs relating to the DNS changer news were identified as possibly containing 
malicious content. During our investigations we found that certain of the sites described how 
the software operated including example code and thus triggered the word based and/or 
heuristic scanning engines of some of the sources working through the VirusTotal API. 
                                                        
32
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Aurora_shooting 
33 http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2406855,00.asp 
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These were obviously excluded from the final results, but it does show that no system for 
detecting malware or malicious content on the web is foolproof, and only by using multiple 
layers of security can a result be truly identified as malicious. 
 
The above examples also show that in the event of vendors not updating their methods of 
scanning, or if they fail to repeatedly scan a URL identified as malicious, the result can easily 
be classified incorrectly, and thus negatively impact on the user experience of that service or 
of the affected URL. 
 
 
Figure 34: Combined Statistics (Logarithmic Scale) – February to August 2012 
 
7.3.2 Malware Collection and Statistics 
 
During the seven month period of data gathering, a total of 254 malware-containing URLs 
were classified by the various tools used. Of these, eight were false positives, as discussed in 
7.3.1. As can be seen in Figure 31, the detected sites with anomalies (malware or malicious 
content) versus the total amount of scraped URLs are minuscule, with only 3.6% of all sites 
classified as malware. While this might not sound like a lot, the result of just one highly 
ranked website being compromised and serving malware to unsuspecting users can impact up 
to ten million users as shown by Barracuda Labs34. 
 
                                                        
34 http://www.barracudalabs.com/goodsitesbad/index.html 
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The results consisted mostly of two type of exploits, one being JS/Relink-B (as classified by 
Sophos) and JS/Ref-C (as classified by Sophos). These, especially the JS/Ref-C exploits, are 
a family of JavaScript Trojans that, when the infected page is viewed in a browser, try to 
redirect the user to a remote malicious site.  
 
What was missing from the findings, something we were actively looking for, was any of the 
Mal/Iframe (as classified by Sophos) versions of malware. This led to another finding, the 
complete absence of the Black Hole Exploit Kit in the sites found, and the complete absence 
of fake anti-virus sites in any of the URLs that we collected. Howard [95] reports that the 
Black Hole Exploit Kit relies heavily on the Mal/Iframe family of injection scripts. None of 
these were found during the research period. 
 
Since Brook [68] had earlier reported that the Black Hole Exploit Kit was responsible for 
93% of all malicious links, the absence was investigated further, and both Giuliani [96] and 
Oliver et al [97] confirmed what was suspected: That the Black Hole Exploit Kit delivers its 
initial payload via an email containing a link to a possible exploited site, with limited 
attempts to gain entry into trending topics on search engines. 
 
7.3.3 Malicious Collection and Statistics 
 
During the research period, substantially fewer malicious results were found than malware 
results. In part this could be due to the classification methods of the software used, and partly 
due to a tool like ‘jsunpack’ being unable to distinguish between malicious javascript and 
malware like an adware serving toolbar. 
 
Figure 35 represents a simple graph of the number of results classified as ‘malicious’ during 
our automated research. As explained above, due to the tools used the malicious classification 
is absent from ‘jsunpack’ but found in VirusTotal. Due to the fact that ‘jsunpack’ was tuned 
to look only for malicious javascript specific to iframe injections and exploit .PDFs, it was 
felt that it would not skew the results, and thus it was still able to give a complete picture of 
the nature of the collected URLs. 
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One of the first interesting results found in the malicious category was the prevalence of 
adware or malicious toolbars, and the associated downloads on sports sites. In 2005 Gordon 
[98] already studied the tendency of sports sites to try trick users in to downloading a toolbar 
which in turns spreads advertisements and spyware to users. Twenty of the results were from 
American football sites, e.g. http://ohiostate.scout.com/, which simply redirects to 
http://www.foxsportsnext.com. Looking at the WHOIS information for the site, we see it 
belongs to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. 
 
Registrant: 
        Intellectual Property Department  
        Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 
        P.O. Box 900  
         Beverly Hills CA 90213-0900 
        USA 
        domains@fox.com +1.3103691000  
 
 
Figure 35: Malicious URLs – February to August 2012 
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Figure 36: Malware URLs – February to August 2012 
 
Some further research points us to reports that the site has served adware in the past, in 
particular Mal/Badsrc-C35. No reports of the actual Fox website serving malicious software 
were found. Further investigation showed that the chances were that adware was spread via 
an advertising partner running on the WordPress platform. As seen in 6.4.1 it is fairly easy 
for an attacker to infect a WordPress website either via vulnerability in the actual code, or via 
vulnerability in the plugins used in the site. 
 
Baccas [99] does a thorough analysis of Mal/Badsrc-C, also classified as Troj/PHPShll-B, 
and shows how this particular exploit infects Wordpress websites, aimed specifically at users 
visiting the site with Internet Explorer, confirming what we saw in 6.2.2 and giving evidence 
to substantiate our findings. While the author is unsure of how it compromised the site, it 
could be anything from a compromised FTP account to a hosting provider with bad cross-
user permissions — i.e. one administration account can access multiple hosted environments. 
 
The rest of the sites on our list were entertainment and news-related sites, with no obvious 
pattern between them. 
 
7.3.4 Unrated Sites Collection and Statistics 
 
Lastly, during the period of research we had 76398 unrated results. A closer inspection of 
these showed that all the results were from VirusTotal. The unrated results are as a result of 
VirusTotal pulling data from various sources, and these sources not having information on 
the URLs that we had fed it. During investigation there was no consistent engine or product 
                                                        
35 http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Mal~Badsrc-C.aspx 
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that filed to provide results, and no pattern could be found between the unrated results and the 
sites that produced this result.  
 
Considering that we collected nearly seven hundred thousand results from VirusTotal, the 
unrated results constituted only one percent of the total number of results. The only concern 
was that in this amount of unrated results, there was the possibility of a malware site that 
slipped through. This was luckily offset by the fact that each result was scanned by thirty 
different engines, all having tied in with the Virustotal API. 
7.4 Closing the loop 
 
Any study into Search Engine Poisoning would not be complete unless a small part is spent 
looking into how to prevent it from happening, or affecting not just the search engine, but the 
end user as well. In this section we will take a look at what some of the search engines are 
doing, as well as what some commercial companies are doing to protect the internet user 
from becoming a victim of an SEP campaign. 
 
7.4.1 Search Engines 
 
During our manual searching efforts, as seen in Chapter 6, several instances were seen where 
Google had made efforts to stop sites from spreading not only malicious content, but  also 
copyrighted information as can be seen in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Google removing a search result 
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This was interesting as these results were between results for other torrent-based websites 
which cram keywords into the search results, and offer downloads of movies and other 
copyright-protected content as seen in Figure 37. Thus, not only do the search engines try 
protect the users from harmful content but also remove entries on request from other entities. 
Discussing these requests is not the purpose of this thesis, thus we will not spend too much 
time on it, but it should be noted that it is important that search engines do attend to these 
requests as the website hosting the copyrighted material can and often does also engage in 
SEP activities. 
 
7.4.2 Browser Safety 
 
Another improvement during the last few years in protecting users from malicious sites, such 
as those serving malware through SEP attacks, is built-in protection in browsers. Certain (but 
not all browsers) have built in protection that warns a user should they be on a site that could 
exhibit malicious behaviour.  
Two of the browsers that were found to successfully exhibit the ability to stop a user from 
visiting a known malicious site were Mozilla’s Firefox and Google’s Chrome browser. 
Without any additional add-ons or tools these browsers provided the ability to warn users as 
can be seen in the screenshots in Figure 38 and Figure 39.  
Unfortunately this can sometimes cause some problems for sites that link from advertising 
partners, or partners serving content, as Mawson [100] reports. In the article, Mawson reports 
that http://www.iol.co.za, one of South Africa’s leading news websites, was flagged for 
having malware. The site itself was not dangerous, but content from a third party was to 
blame. According to the report, it was initially the Google Chrome browser that first reported 
the problem to users, but the message then propagated to the search engine results provided to 
all users of Google, irrespective of what browser the user was using at the time. 
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Figure 38: Mozilla Firefox warning  
 
Figure 39: Google Chrome warning  
In such a case the site owner is then forced to contact Google and prove that the malicious 
code has been removed, before the warning will be removed from Google’s search engine 
and Google Chrome’s built-in warning system. While it may be an inconvenience to website 
owners, it does prove that some search engines are serious about protecting the end user. 
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7.4.3 Third party tools 
 
Discussing the effectiveness of third party tools in stopping malware infected SEP pages 
would be enough to fill an entire thesis on its own. Just the search for ‘safe surfing software’ 
on Google yielded 17 400 000 results at the time of writing. Thus, we focus on the three tools 
used during Chapter 6 in identifying possible pages. These tools were MacAfee SiteAdvisor 
[101], Avast WebRep [102] and the Web of Trust [103] browser plugin. At the time of 
writing, the Web of Trust plugin alone had 47 744 000 downloads, giving us a good 
indication of the popularity (and hence effectiveness) of the tool. The following section is not 
a detailed discussion of the tools, but simply an overview of each of the tools in order to give 
the reader an effective way to combat SEP poisoned websites. 
 
7.4.3.1 McAfee SiteAdvisor 
 
McAfee SiteAdvisor [100] is a free application from the McAfee Corporation. The 
application is downloaded to the user’s machine and installed. Once installed the application 
will add a specific warning to results and help find the user safer alternatives. 
 
McAfee builds the reputation index by visiting websites, downloading applications where 
possible and testing these websites and applications for adware, spyware and viruses. Where 
the tools find that there is a virus, Trojan or malware included in the software or website, it 
flags the site as ‘red’ and users visiting the site are then warned. 
 
7.4.3.2  Avast WebRep 
 
Avast Antivirus [101] states that “Avast WebRep combines antivirus software with website 
ratings from millions of users in the global avast! community – providing users of avast! 6.0 
with a community-sourced guide to the safety and/or content of websites. avast! users can 
thus know – before clicking a link – what to expect in terms of product or service quality, 
customer service levels, or website safety and reliability. Ratings results are “traffic-light” 
simple:  green = GO… orange = CAUTION… red = STOP!” 
 
Since the service depends on the input of users it can sometimes be confusing, since a site 
that hosts pornography might be rated as green. This is because the site itself is safe to visit, 
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and posts no danger to the user, but the category system that the software uses will still warn 
the user of the content. Another example could be a normal blog, running WordPress 
software, but a number of users might have had issues with the site serving fake anti-virus, 
and thus rated the site as dangerous as per the example we found in Chapter 6. 
 
7.4.3.3 Web of Trust 
 
Web of Trust [102] is another community driven project, using a reputation database to guide 
users. The application itself is an internet browser add-on that installs locally on the user’s 
computer, and once installed, gives a website rating for every site that a user might visit, 
based on the reputation database. 
 
The reputation database is built on user submissions, as well as submissions from websites 
like phishtank36. It also uses a simple green, orange and red classification scheme to warn 
users. Unlike the Avast! categories, Web of Trust uses only four categories, one of which is 
‘child safety’. Thus a website that might contain pornography can get a green rating for 
trustworthiness, privacy, and vendor reliability, but get a red rating for child safety. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of our automated research dataset, looking at the data 
that was collected in the 31 week period from February to August 2012. The chapter looked 
at how the data was processed, the amount of URLs contained in the dataset, the amount of 
results that were processed, and the malware and malicious URLs found in the dataset. The 
research results were positive with a small amount of malware and malicious URLs found. 
These were analysed and the malware or malicious content identified. 
 
A small section was also dedicated to the false positives in the dataset and the reasons or 
causes of these false positives, including investigating and analysing some of the more 
specific URLs that were flagged as false positives. 
 
                                                        
36 http://www.phishtank.com/ 
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Lastly time was spent looking at ways that are being implemented by search engines, open 
source projects and commercial products to try to prevent Search Engine Poisoning 
campaigns from exploiting and infecting users on the internet, including example outputs 
from these sources. 
 
This chapter concludes the analysis done for the data sets that were collected during the 
research period. The following chapter contains the conclusions and summary for the thesis, 
where the research objectives are revisited and possibilities for future research are looked at. 
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8.Conclusion 
 
The research that comprises this thesis consists of two sets of findings and a historical view 
of Search Engine Poisoning. The historical view in Chapter 4 looks at two celebrity deaths 
and the associated Search Engine Poisoning campaigns that were launched with those deaths 
and a third campaign that focused on a sexual content and thus peaked user curiosity through 
such means to try lure victims to the campaign. 
 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 the results of a manual and an automated search process are 
discussed with several campaigns found, spread through different means, including 
compromised plugins in popular web hosting software. The two sets of findings are as 
follows: 
 
 A manual set of three search results and the associated data analysis that was done 
with these results. These results were collected between June 2012 and July 2012 and 
are discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
 
 A dataset of 44 874 URLs presented in Chapter 7, with a combined result of 
1 346 220 results attained through the various toolsets used (as discussed in Section 
3.4), including 698 943 alone from the VirusTotal API. This was collected from 1 
February 2012 to 31 August 2012 over a 31 week period. Of this collection 254 were 
identified as possibly having malware content, and a further 20 malicious URLs were 
found. 
 
8.1 Research objectives 
 
As defined in chapter 1, our research objectives were as follows: 
 
1. Firstly, to look at and investigate case studies of Search Engine Poisoning in 2011, 
particularly with regards to news events that made headlines. This was done to 
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establish a baseline for the type of results that we hoped to find in the manual and 
automated research chapters. Several examples were found and explored in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
2. The second objective of the research was to look for Search Engine Poisoned sites 
using manual search methods. During this period of research several examples of 
Search Engine Poisoning were found with relative ease, and investigated in detail. 
The results were compared to historic data from academic and industry sources, and 
allowed us to make comparisons to determine behaviour changes in techniques and 
results, along with proving just how easily these campaigns still catch the average 
internet user.  
 
3. The third part of the research involved retrieving data over a period of seven months 
and running this collected data through various tools as described in Chapter 3. The 
collected data was then analysed for trends and the results presented. 
 
 
8.2 Research Findings 
 
Our research findings have been split into two parts: The manual searching, and the 
automated searching results. 
 
8.2.1 Manual Research Findings 
 
 
The manual research imitated the behaviour of the average internet user, searching for 
information on trending topics, celebrities, or news events, and provided us with three 
different results from three different Search Engine Poisoning campaigns, each delivering a 
different type of malware to the victim’s computer. The first result delivered a botnet Trojan 
to the test machine, and the next two results netted the research a fake anti-virus program and 
an ad-ware installer. 
 
These results were obtained searching for simple keywords and focusing on some trending 
topics at the time, including the 2012 Summer Olympics. These results simply proved that 
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Search Engine Poisoning campaigns are still running on the internet, that these campaigns are 
taking on different approaches in the way they try to lure the user, and that they deliver 
various different types of malware to the victim’s computer. We can safely assume that the 
industry concern over Search Engine Poisoning is legitimate, and all internet users in the 
foreseeable future would be wise to exercise caution. 
 
8.2.2 Automated Research Findings 
 
 
The automated research in this paper focused on the gathering of the top ten trending topics 
on the Google search engine, gathering the URLs associated with these trends on a daily 
basis, and testing each of these URLs in our dataset for Search Engine Poisoning content 
through the use of three different tools. 
 
Our total result set comprised of 1 346 220 results over the research period from the 
beginning of February to the end of August 2012 (a period of 31 weeks), obtained from 
44 874 URLs. The results from this dataset included 254 URLs that contained some sort of 
malware, and a further 20 malicious URLs. There were a total of 76398 unrated results in our 
dataset, but since the collected data was run through multiple sources, this was considered not 
to have skewed the results.  
 
The false positives that were identified and analysed led to an interesting discovery: That 
some of the engines we used in the scanning keep residual data for an extended period of 
time, and in doing so, mark sites that are now clean and safe as still dangerous. 
 
Looking at the complete dataset that was analysed, it still proves that Search Engine 
Poisoning does make its way into the top trending topics on search engines — and not just 
through obscure results, but in the top 200 URLs that typical users might visit during the 
course of a day. 
 
8.3 Future Research 
 
Three possible objectives of future research have come to the fore. 
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1. Applying the same automated search mechanism for the .za TLD, focusing 
specifically on South Africa, and attacks that are aimed at, or originate from sites in 
the TLD. To date, no such research has been found, but it could very well be that 
there is such research in progress. 
  
2. Adapting the research methodology and identifying the Search Engine Poisoning 
landscape within the African continent. During the Arab Spring, and the death of 
Gaddafi, several Search Engine Poisoning campaigns were seen on the internet, and 
thus looking at a specific African context should yield some interesting results. 
 
3. Studying the effectiveness of third party software in combating malicious websites, 
and comparing gateway efforts versus end point efforts through a set collection of 
malicious sites. An addition to this study would include looking at the effectiveness of 
commercial versus open source products.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
The research objective during this thesis, and the various methods of research employed 
during the gathering of the datasets used (both manual and automated), set out to look at the 
prevalence of Search Engine Poisoning in modern search engines. 
 
Research in this thesis looked at the evolution of exploit kits on the internet, how they 
evolved, and the current eco-system around Search Engine Poisoning and how easy it is for 
criminals to run a campaign. 
 
Three examples of S;earch Engine Poisoning were examined during the manual data 
gathering, and 254 results reporting malware were found during our 31 week automated data 
gathering period. 
 
The final chapter showed that even with all the defensive measures in place by search 
engines, they are still exploited by Search Engine Poisoning campaigns and that it is still a 
caution for the everyday internet user.   
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